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We believe that the world, 
even this terrible, intricate world 
can be understood, interpreted, transformed, 
 and put to the service of humankind, of its wellbeing, of its felicity. 
 The struggle for this aim can fulfill a whole life worthily. 
Enrico Berlinguer 
 
Everyone can speak obscurely, only the few can speak clearly. 
Galileo Galilei 
 
A process cannot be understood by stopping it. 
Understanding must move with the flow of the process, 
must join it and flow with it. 
Frank Herbert 
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Abstract 
Virtual currencies have recently emerged at the intersection of Internet and 
finance, bringing unprecedented innovations in payment systems, money and 
finance. In particular, Bitcoin is examined as the first example of virtual currency, 
dating back to 2009. Ever since virtual currencies emerged, they received 
increased attention from public, private and societal regulators, especially in the 
field of finance. Since regulation of Bitcoin is still in its infancy, this project will 
rather aim to unpack the underlying rationalities of power. Employing the concept 
of governmentality, this thesis performs Critical Discourse Analysis on policy 
papers, statements and press releases from public, private and societal regulators 
of finance. Rationalities of power and regulation are unpacked along three 
categories: ideas over the object that has to be regulated; ideas over the objectives 
that regulation has to achieve; ideas over the technical tools to be employed to 
achieve said aims. The results envision a future in which regulation will be public, 
transnational and permissive. The attitude of regulators is aimed at co-opetition, 
understood as a mix of competition and co-optation of virtual currencies in the 
current paradigm of regulation of money and finance. The future scenario will be 
mostly decided by strategic employment of material and institutional power by 
public and private actors in order either to limit or to support the adoption and 
diffusion of virtual currencies. However, it seems unlikely that virtual currencies 
will simply vanish in the future. 
Keywords: Bitcoin, Governmentality, Critical Discourse Analysis, Currency, 
Regulation. 
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I. Introduction 
In the last decades, the speed and the relevance of flows of capital have steadily 
increased, both within and across national boundaries: especially Internet has 
revolutionized not only stock exchanges, but also banking and payment systems 
(Turpin 2014). Thanks to this, the size of digitalized money employed in 
commerce and other payments has increased at a skyrocketing pace. Innovation, 
digitalization and interconnectedness allow new agents to emerge in the 
transnational arena, challenging the current regulatory framework in banking, 
payment systems and finance more in general (Committee on Payments and 
Market Infrastructures 2014). Adding to this increased complexity, the 2007-08 
financial crisis has brought into question the legitimacy and the trustworthiness of 
the established intermediaries and decision makers (Blundell-Wignall 2014; 
Negurita 2014). In the recent years social movements have emerged, which ask 
for a new financial order (Chomsky 2012; Harvey 2013) and more transparency 
and privacy for costumers and users, thus challenging the role of powerful 
financial intermediaries (Joh 2013). 
The emergence of Bitcoin
1
 and virtual currencies can be understood as the product 
of all the aforementioned phenomena. Bitcoin is a new financial instrument, a new 
IT technology, and a political project which questions the way in which money is 
managed. Bitcoin is a virtual currency managed through a dispersed network, with 
no center of power. It allows users to transfer money in an anonymous way all 
over the world using open source software, and with low or absent transaction 
fees (Hendrickson, Hogan, and Luther 2014). Moreover, exchanges between 
bitcoins and other national currencies are free, as long as there is supply and 
demand. First introduced in 2009, Bitcoin has grown both in popular interest and 
in the number and size of transactions (Garcia et al. 2014). The number of 
merchants accepting bitcoins for payments is on the rise, and includes important 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, Bitcoin will be used with the capital B to define the network, the protocol, and the 
organizations which in any way collaborate to the development of the virtual currency, as well as 
the virtual currency itself. On the other side, bitcoin with the lower case letter – or the abbreviation 
BTC – will be used to define the single currency unit, and quantities of money denominated in 
bitcoins.  
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retailers such as Dell and Microsoft (Dell Inc. n.d.; Microsoft Corporation [2014] 
2014), and societal actors such as Wikimedia Foundation (Wikimedia Foundation 
2014) and Wikileaks (Wikileaks n.d.). Moreover, in the US, the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) has allowed the funding of political campaigns with bitcoins 
(Federal Election Commission 2014). All these developments have drawn the 
attention of multiple regulatory agencies. 
1. Research Question and Aim. 
The transnational monetary and financial landscape has already moved from the 
public monopoly in the issuance of sovereign currencies, to an oligopoly of 
competing currencies (Cohen 1999; Cohen 2001; Cohen [2008] 2008; Cohen 
2011). Bitcoin can be seen as the next in this evolution: Bitcoin is the first private, 
virtual, convertible and transnational currency. What has to be understood is how 
the old and new regulators of money and finance are framing Bitcoin and private 
money, and which role they will play in the future. This project will address the 
question of how is the emergence of Bitcoin, understood as private virtual money, 
changing the governmentality of money at a transnational level? 
Drawing on Foucault, governmentality is defined “how we think about governing 
others and ourselves in a wide variety of contexts” (Dean [1999] 2010, 267). 
Governmentality, thus, is the rationality of government, understood as “[any] 
relatively systematic way of thinking about government. This can include the 
form of representation for the field to be governed, the agencies to be considered 
and enrolled in governing, the techniques to be employed, and the ends to be 
achieved” (Ibid: 268). Especially, three dimensions of governmentality are 
important: the episteme (the representation of the field, the agencies, and 
everything that relates to how to govern, and what has to be governed), the telos 
(the ends to be achieved by governing), and the techne (the specific tools that 
have to be employed in governing). This thesis will perform Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) on a sample of official documents aimed at regulating Bitcoin, 
issued by public, private and societal regulators of finance. I will, on one side, 
reconstruct the governmentality of money as it is now. On the other side, I will 
see how this governmentality changes in response to Bitcoin. 
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2. Background Information and Key Terminology. 
a) What Bitcoin is, and How It Works. 
Bitcoin is “a decentralized virtual currency scheme with bidirectional flow, and a 
cryptocurrency” (Segendorf [2014] 2014, 73). A “virtual currency scheme” is a 
means of payment in which transactions take place only within and through 
internet. Unlike electronic money, payments through a virtual currency scheme 
are not denominated in any pre-existing unit of account, such as US Dollars, 
Swedish Krona or UK Pound Sterling. Instead, payments are denominated in the 
virtual currency itself. BTCs are units of account associated with “wallets”, which 
are digital identities, such as e-mail accounts. Transactions take place between the 
wallet of the sender and the one of the receiver, by switching the wallet associated 
to a certain amount of BTCs. 
Bitcoin is decentralized: transactions take place in a horizontal, peer-to-peer (P2P) 
network, a network with no server and trusted third party. In payment systems 
such as inter-bank payments or PayPal, there is the need for an authority to 
validate transactions: a bank or a payment service provider such as PayPal (See 
Figure 1 on Page 4). In payments in cash an intermediary is also required: the 
central bank is the one which decides how much cash to issue, and the state 
decides which currencies are considered legal means of payment – legal tender – 
in a given jurisdiction. None of the aforementioned institutions is needed in 
Bitcoin. All the transactions are not validated by any intermediary, but they are 
rather validated by the whole network. 
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Figure 1: Standard Payment Systems (Federal Reserve [2014] 2014, 36) 
Bitcoin is a bidirectional currency: it allows free exchanges between BTCs and 
other currencies insofar as there is demand of legal tenders on one side, and 
supply of bitcoins on the other. In short, one can freely exchange US Dollars for 
bitcoins, and the other way around, as long as there is someone selling one of the 
two currencies, and accepting the other in return. Decentralized virtual currencies 
such as Bitcoin are called cryptocurrencies, because they employ cryptography to 
validate transactions. Every user has two keys, one private and one public. 
Through the use of the private key, no Bitcoin user can access the BTCs in one 
wallet besides the rightful owner. The public key, on the other hand, is used in 
transactions. 
Example (see Figure 2): Anna (A) wants to send some bitcoins to Brian (B). She 
issues a transfer of some BTCs to Brian’s wallet. In order to do that, she needs her 
own private key in order to access her wallet, and Brian’s public key to issue the 
payment. The payment, then, is encrypted using Brian’s public key. In order for 
the payment to be accepted, Brian has to de-encrypt it using his private key. Thus, 
if a private key is lost, all the BTCs contained in a wallet are lost. On the other 
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hand, if the private key falls in the hands of someone else, this will allow the 
“thief” to perform unwanted, illegitimate transactions. 
 
Figure 2: Bitcoin Transaction (Dhuri and Shah). 
Once the payment is accepted, it is broadcasted to the network of “miners”. 
Miners are powerful computers which validate transactions. In order to perform 
this task, miners have to solve complex mathematical problems. This task, called 
proof-of-work (Ali et al. 2014), is a way to show that the miners are not 
fraudulently validating illegitimate transactions, and thus can be trusted. Once one 
miner has solved the problem, the solution is broadcasted to the other miners and 
they “vote” on the validation. Each miner has a weighted vote according to the 
share of computational power the computer has in comparison with the whole 
network of miners. When a decision is taken, the transaction is added to the 
blockchain, which basically is a spreadsheet in which all transactions are stored 
(Turpin 2014), from the first moment in which Bitcoin has started functioning. 
For the effort of validating transactions, miners are rewarded with newly mined 
bitcoins. Transactions are put together in blocks every 10 minutes (Kondor et al. 
2014) forming a block, which is validated as a whole, rather than transaction per 
transaction. When a block is validated – or mined – the network generates new 
BTCs, and gives them to the computer which successfully validated the block. 
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The number of newly mined BTCs was originally 50 per block. This quantity is 
halved every 210.000 blocks: the number of BTCs being created will reduce over 
time, and the total amount of BTC in circulation will top 21 billion, expectedly in 
2140 (Brito and Castillo 2014). After that point, the only incentive for miners to 
validate transactions will be transaction fees. Thus, the gratuity of transaction – 
one of the main strength of Bitcoin – may no longer be in place in the future. 
Bitcoin is different from electronic money – or e-money – such as PayPal and 
other electronic means of payment (Omwansa and Sullivan 2012), because it is 
not backed by any legal tender currency, such as the US Dollar or the Euro. 
Instead, Bitcoin is a currency in its own right. Bitcoin differs from sovereign 
currencies since it is not issued by any central bank, and its adoption is not 
compulsory in any territorial jurisdiction (Rotman 2014). Rather, the use and 
acceptance of Bitcoin is determined by supply and demand of it (Cohen 2001), 
and from a voluntary, tacit agreement among users, miners, currency exchangers 
and merchants to accept it as a means of payment. 
In common with nowadays legal tender currencies, however, Bitcoin has the fact 
that it is not backed by any real asset, such as gold or other physical objects: legal 
currencies and Bitcoin are only fiat money (Castronova 2014). The value of fiat 
money is not connected to a real asset such as precious metals. Rather, value is 
only based on the trust given to issuer of the currency, being it a state or a virtual 
community. The difference is that legal tender currencies draw their real value 
from their compulsory adoption: merchants, banks and any other commercial 
institutions are “forced” to accept that currency as a means of payment, while 
Bitcoin is completely voluntary. Moreover, a legal tender fiat currency is 
contingently scarce: the government or the central bank can decide to inject or 
withdraw liquidity in the system through monetary policy tools. Bitcoin, on the 
other side, is inherently scarce: the amount of bitcoins in circulation is 
predetermined, thus monetary policy decisions are impossible. 
b) Bitcoin’s History. 
Forecasts of the coming of electronic money date back to the late 1990s and early 
2000s (Cohen 2001). In the same period, the cryptographer and crypto-anarchist 
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Wei Dai published the first idea of a cryptocurrency on a cyberpunk newsletter 
(Wei Dai 1998). Bitcoin as we know it was born theoretically only on 2008 in a 
paper written by an unknown cryptologist under the alias of Satoshi Nakamoto 
(Lemieux 2013; Nakamoto 2008), and started to work in practice in early 2009: 
the first block (the Genesis Block) was mined on January, 3
rd
 (Bitcoin Wiki 
2014). Nakamoto disappeared from any Bitcoin-related forum in 2010 and has 
been missing ever since. The obscure identity of its founder is the main reason 
behind both the curiosity and the bad press concerning Bitcoin (Vigna and Casey 
2015). 
Until now, Bitcoin has witnessed an impressive, yet swinging growth in the 
number of users, the amount of money exchanged, and in the curiosity by the 
public (Garcia et al. 2014). The number of merchants and businesses accepting 
Bitcoin as a means of payment has increased in the last years, even though less 
and less sharply over the years. However, even big players such as Dell and 
Microsoft now accept Bitcoin (Microsoft Corporation 2014). The number of users 
has grown from 500 in 2012, to over 3 million in 2015 (Blockchain.info 2015a), 
the number of transactions per day increased from 5000 in 2012 to around 
100.000 in 2015 (Blockchain.info 2015b). Moreover, this increase in curiosity and 
the growing number of users has caused a proliferation of Bitcoin-based and 
Bitcoin-inspired cryptocurrencies, called alternative coins or “altcoins”. Some 
estimate in 200 the number of cryptocurrencies currently in place (WSBI [2014] 
2014, 4). 
 
Figure 3: Number of Bitcoin “My Wallet” users from 2009 until 2015 (Blockchain.info 2015a). 
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Figure 4: Number of Bitcoin transactions per day from 2009 (Blockchain.info 2015b). 
Time has shown that the hype surrounding Bitcoin has brought in business a host 
of operators which were not prepared well enough to deal with security issues. On 
the 9
th
 of April 2013, a cyberattack hit the biggest Bitcoin exchange to date, 
Mt.Gox., causing the loss of 744.400 BTCs, worth tens of million US Dollars 
(The Economist 2014). This caused the price of bitcoins to fall from over 200 
USD per BTC, to around 70. Mt.Gox. then filled in for bankruptcy, and there is 
not any news yet as to how the damaged users will be refunded. Later that year, 
the online illegal market Silk Road – which accepted bitcoins – was shut down by 
being “the Ebay of drugs” (Barratt 2012, 683), causing another fall in BTC price. 
In general, as it is shown by the Bank of France (Bank of France [2013] 2013), the 
value of Bitcoin has sudden and sharp increases connected to either bad or good 
news connected to it. On the other hand, most of the security problems do not 
derive from Bitcoin itself, but rather from untrustworthy third-parties. 
 
Figure 5: Bitcoin’s exchange rate from 2010 to 2013 (Bank of France [2013] 2013, 4). 
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These security scandals surrounding Bitcoin, and the sharp fluctuation in value, 
are affecting adoption of Bitcoin among merchants and exchangers. This is often 
defined as a chicken-and-egg problem: if fewer merchants are eager to accept 
Bitcoin, it will be less valuable and more instable in its value. On the other side, 
until Bitcoin remains volatile, fewer merchants will be eager to accept it as a 
means of payment (Goldman Sachs [2014] 2014, 18). 
c) Bitcoin’s Political Project. 
Bitcoin was born within the crypto-anarchist and cyberpunk community (Vigna 
and Casey 2015). Moreover, Bitcoin was born in the same years in which the 
financial crisis reached its peak (Ibid). Even though this concomitance could be 
totally serendipitous, many of the elements of Bitcoin’s political nature are 
strongly intertwined with the questions raised by the crisis. Bitcoin’s political 
elements can be synthesized as both anti-systemic and radically neoliberal in 
nature. Bitcoin is anti-systemic insofar as it proposes a way of conducting 
exchanges and managing money which gets rid of intermediaries and puts the 
users themselves in charge of managing transactions (Maurer, Nelms, and Swartz 
2013). 
A second “radical” element of Bitcoin is the stress it puts on the need for 
anonymity and privacy for the users. Bitcoin does not allow anyone to associate 
unequivocally a real person with a Bitcoin user. This is especially relevant if 
analyzed in the light of the Wikileaks and NSA scandals, and of the SWIFT case. 
In this last case, both US and European intelligence and police authorities asked to 
have access to SWIFT’s database, which represents one of the riches datasets 
concerning financial transactions (Romaniello 2013). Bitcoin’s anonymity, 
however, is overestimated: Bitcoin’s transactions are almost anonymous, i.e. 
pseudonymous
2
. These exchanges remain less anonymous than payments in cash, 
which are not traceable at all: all the public keys of all Bitcoin users are in plain 
sight, and so are the transactions associated to these public keys. A skilled IT 
                                                 
2
 Pseudonymous means that the identity of a user is permanently hidden behind a pseudonym, in 
this case the address of his or her wallet. This address, however, is completely disclosed and it 
never changes unless the user opens a new wallet.  
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scholar or practitioner can reconstruct patterns of transaction and identify real 
users starting from Bitcoin public keys (Kondor et al. 2014). 
A third libertarian element of Bitcoin comes from the philosophy behind the 
software employed. Cryptocurrencies, and especially Bitcoin, are based on open 
source code, thus freely available for developers to change. However, all the 
operators in Bitcoin’s network need to run the same version of the software and 
protocol, otherwise a “fork” might happen: miners using different version of the 
software will produce different blockchains. This will result in the creation of a 
parallel virtual currency, with its own public ledger of transactions, its own 
network of users and miners, depending on which software they are running. 
Every technical change in the protocol might result in a political division of the 
network of users. For this reason, changes in the software have to be adopted with 
the consensus of almost all the users and developers (Bitcoin.org 2015; Cusumano 
2014). 
Bitcoin is not only a radical anti-system political project: it is also deeply neo-
liberal. The concerns with how to manage transactions is mirrored by a 
completely de-politicized vision of money: the maximum amount of bitcoins is 
pre-determined and it mimics gold extraction, and it cannot be managed by 
anyone (Karlstrøm 2014; Kostakis and Giotitsas 2014; Maftei 2014; Maurer, 
Nelms, and Swartz 2013). The maximum amount of bitcoins could only be 
changed by changing the core code of Bitcoin’s software, but that would create a 
new virtual currency, in competition with Bitcoin, rather than changing Bitcoin 
itself (Karlstrøm 2014). Moreover, it is a de-nationalized currency, and it is 
private. These elements seem to agree with the neo-liberal economist Friedrich 
Hayek (Hayek 1990) who, in the 1970s, theorized a world of competing 
denationalized currencies, each of which inspired by gold-standard-like economic 
models, competing over acceptance and reliability, in a process which would have 
let only the fittest survive. 
Given this twofold anti-system and neo-liberal elements inherent to Bitcoin, this 
new currency represent an example of “distributed capitalism” (Kostakis and 
Bauwens 2014, 18; Kostakis and Giotitsas 2014, 431). Distributed capitalism 
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“matches distributed control on the infrastructure [...] while maintaining a focus 
on capital accumulation. Under this technological regime, P2P infrastructures are 
designed in such a way as to allow the autonomy and participation of many 
players. [...] [P]ersonal motivation are driven by exchange, trade, and profit” 
(Kostakis and Bauwens 2014, 30–31). 
3. Literature Review. 
The Law Library of Congress has recently published a report on the regulatory 
landscape (Law Library of Congress [2014] 2014). The results of this research 
have been rather inconclusive: Bitcoin’s regulation is still in its infancy, and there 
is no unitary approach on how to properly regulate the issue at hand. Ly’s analysis 
of the American regulation (Ly 2014) has been slightly different, since it analyzed 
the nature of Bitcoin and compared different ways to govern this new 
phenomenon. In particular, this research tried to understand the structure of 
Bitcoin’s network, in order to understand which actors to regulate, if users, 
exchangers, software developers, miners or merchants. 
Other authors have engaged in the classification of Bitcoin in the financial system 
of products and assets. Some see it as mainly a currency (Evans-Pughe 2012), 
others as an investment (Baek and Elbeck 2014; Gross, Hoelscher, and Reed 
2014; Wu and Pandey 2014), and others as a commodity like physical objects 
(Jacobsen and Peña 2014). Opinions over how to regulate Bitcoin differ precisely 
because its multifold nature and the multifold understanding the different authors 
have of it. Some stress the risks of Bitcoin’s secrecy and aim to regulate its 
potential uses for money laundering, drug dealing and terrorism (Barratt 2012; 
Barratt, Lenton, and Allen 2013; Bryans 2014). Others are concerned with 
Bitcoin’s transnationality and its potential for tax evasion (Internal Revenue 
Service, USA 2014; Jacobsen and Peña 2014). Others, lastly, want to enhance 
consumer protection in face of risks concerning volatility and loss of value, fraud 
and cyberattacks (Congiu [2013] 2013; Connell 2014; Harper 2014; Parthemer 
and Klein 2014). 
Other authors have scrutinized Bitcoin as a technological enhancement, capable of 
improving several kinds of economic activities. For instance, Bitcoin assures low-
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fee transactions throughout the world, thus being potentially a very powerful tool 
for remittances and other small transactions worldwide (Thomas 2014). 
Moreover, it is able to provide basic banking tools and payment systems to the 
“unbanked” (Vigna and Casey 2015), and a currency which, if stabilized in terms 
of exchange rates, could secure value from hyperinflation in some countries 
historically afflicted by it (Brito and Castillo 2014; van Alstyne 2014). Others 
stress how Bitcoin’s protocol can be used to secure any kind of transaction and 
exchange of information, from validating research results and papers (Mas 2014) 
to votes in elections (Aron 2012; Aron 2014; Clark and Essex [14712/2011] 2011; 
Filippi 2014). 
There is one last strand of literature which scrutinizes the rationality and political 
project underlying Bitcoin (Blanchette 2011; Kostakis and Bauwens 2014; 
Kostakis and Giotitsas 2014; Maurer, Nelms, and Swartz 2013; Pinch and 
Swedberg 2008). These studies are the few ones which acknowledge the political 
content of Bitcoin and not only the tricky technical dimensions of how it impacts 
on the established framework of actors, rules and technological infrastructures. 
The analysis of the literature shows a sensitive gap in unpacking Bitcoin’s 
political implications. Moreover, an analysis of the interests and powers which are 
being mobilized in response to this new challenge is completely missing. Most of 
the literature concentrates on Bitcoin seen as a technical element, either in finance 
or in information technologies. In short what is here overlooked is, as Maurer et 
al. point out, that with Bitcoin “maybe the problem is money itself” (Maurer, 
Nelms, and Swartz 2013, 261). This thesis aims at filling this gap. What 
differentiates this project from the last strand of literature I analyzed is that I will 
not study the internal rationality of Bitcoin, but rather the rationality of 
transnational regulators of money and finance, and how this rationality is changed 
in response to the emergence of Bitcoin. 
4. Expected contribution 
The main problem with the current research on virtual currencies is that Bitcoin is 
framed only within the current paradigm of money, currency and finance. What is 
overlooked is precisely that Bitcoin is born beyond and partially against the 
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established ways of thinking and governing money: my aim is precisely to 
scrutinize whether and how Bitcoin is changing that paradigm. 
Regulation of Bitcoin is still in its infancy. Some might see that as a challenge and 
a weakness. I would rather say that this is the main point of strength of this thesis. 
On one side, we still are in a too early stage to assess the material impact of 
virtual currencies and their regulation on the financial system. On the other hand, 
this is the perfect moment in which to observe the rationalities that will shape and 
inform future regulation. This thesis aims to detect the driving ideational forces 
and their possible future directions in governing private virtual money. In short, 
why would we care studying a phenomenon like Bitcoin? I think that Benjamin 
Cohen’s words are clearer than any other explanation: 
“In the end, then, we find that the traditional Westphalian model has 
become little more than a convenient fiction […] where the sovereign 
state once ruled, market forces now prevail. Does it matter? Given 
money’s central role in modern economies, the answer is most certainly 
yes. Money affects us all, every day of our lives; its impacts are manifold 
and direct. The real issue is the legitimacy of decision-making in this new 
deterritorialised system of governance – a decidedly normative question. 
Should we be content with this dramatically new geography of money? 
[…] Currency deterritorialisation does matter” (Cohen 1999, 135). 
5. Outline of the Thesis. 
This thesis is structured as follows: the second chapter is devoted to the 
theoretical framework and its operationalization for the subject at hand; the third 
chapter explains the methodological framework and goes in-depth in the methods 
and tools used in this project; the fourth chapter will perform the analysis of the 
collected data and, in the fifth conclusive chapter, I will synthesize and discuss the 
outcomes of the analysis and spell out my conclusive remarks on the subject.  
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II. Theoretical Framework. 
Globalization has fostered once again the debate between those who put states at 
the center, as monopolist of political power, and those who picture the 
international system as populated by a wider range of actors (Scholte 2005). 
Twenty years ago Susan Strange argued that authority and power were no more in 
the sole hands of states. The consequence of this was ungovernance, a “yawning 
hole of non-authority” in international politics (Strange 1996, 14). On the other 
side, Saskia Sassen (Sassen [2006] 2008) argued that deterritorialization does not 
imply the end of geography: the task, rather, is to “de-reify globalization” (Ibid: 
14-5). Benjamin Cohen (Cohen 1999; Cohen [2008] 2008; Cohen 2011) has 
shown how, in monetary policy, the market is increasingly seen as the regulatory 
arena, through competition and private self-regulation. However, leaving 
regulation to the market does not mean that no one governs: an increasing number 
of new private actors now play a political role. Globalization is not a matter of 
missing rulers, but of new rulers. It is not about absence of power, but about 
reshaping power. 
Regulation is performed not only via public hard laws, but also though soft rules, 
standards, best practices and voluntary codes. Seemingly voluntary, technical 
agreements become quasi-binding rules, which are often implemented by public 
authorities only as a second step (Botzem and Dobusch 2012; Botzem and 
Hofmann 2010; Botzem and Quack 2009; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006a). 
Regulation is more and more often established by private actors and technical 
agencies. This challenges the private-public division of authority and power 
without removing governance altogether (Cutler 1999; Cutler 2009; Cutler and 
Gill 2014b; Strange 1996). Finance is one field in which this growing influence of 
Regulatory Standard Setting (RSS) (Abbott and Snidal 2009) can be observed 
more clearly. Thus, the end of the primacy of public authority does not imply the 
end of authority altogether. Rather, it is now unavoidable to study how these new 
actors negotiate power and regulation at a transnational level. What is needed is 
an overarching theoretical framework which allows detecting authority in its new 
forms. 
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1. New Actors and Actor Constellations in the Transnational Space. 
We have said thus far that new actors have emerged in several fields. We have 
now to conceptualize this changing actor constellation. Abbott and Snidal propose 
a tripartite categorization in States, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
Firms. This conceptual framework has served as a basis for other studies on 
transnational governance and regulation by a variety of scholars coming from 
different approaches (Abbott and Snidal 2009; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 
2006b; Graz and Nölke 2008a). In Figure 6 there is a graphical representation of 
the Governance Triangle. The vertexes are occupied by “pure” actors (States, 
Firms and NGOs). Areas 4, 5 and 6 stand for mixed regulators, and the triangle 
number 7 comprehends actors with the all three types of membership within it. 
 
Figure 6: The Governance Triangle (Abbott and 
Snidal 2009, 48). 
  
Figure 7: The Governance Triangle Reworked. 
While acknowledging the important contribution of this framework, I would say 
that Public, Societal and Private Actors could be more suitable labels for the 
different players in the transnational arena (Figure 7). First, “Public Actors” could 
be better than “States” for it preserves the internal variety of ways of acting which 
differentiate States, sub-state territorial branches of government, specialized 
public agencies, and international organizations. Second, “Societal Actors” is a 
better label than NGOs because it focuses more on the source of authority and 
legitimacy, and on the functions performed, rather than on the organizational form 
of the actors. Societal actors, thus, encompass grassroots movements, influential 
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individual people and NGOs. Private Actors is preferable to Firms because it 
encompasses also business organizations and business-related technical agencies, 
which are not only profit-driven, so they do not qualify completely as firms. 
Claire Cutler puts business-related technical agencies in a separate field, with a 
form of authority in its own rights (Cutler 2012). She claims that technical 
expertise is a third source of authority, distinguished from both public and private. 
Yet, I argue that technical actors and business organizations share a concern with 
the well-functioning of markets, a business-related accountability and rationality 
which makes them more similar to each other than to the other two categories. 
2. Historical Structures and Fields. 
Robert Cox theorized power as organized in historical structures, understood as 
“limited totalities […] [i.e.] the historical structure does not represent the whole 
world but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its historically located 
totality” (COX [1981] 1981, 137). The meaning of “sphere of human activity”, 
however, remains rather uncertain: how can we draw clear boundaries between 
one historical structure and another? Susan Strange proposes a delimitation of 
fields according to functions and markets (Strange 1996, 41–42). Strange, thus, 
understands fields as determined by chains of economic interconnectedness. 
Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, on the other hand draw upon a definition of “field” 
understood as a “totality of coexisting facts which are conceived of as mutually 
interdependent” (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006b, 19). A field, thus, is not 
only determined by chains of cause and effect which makes it internally 
interconnected and interdependent, but also by subjective construction. A field not 
only is interdependent, but is also constructed as interdependent. I will keep the 
causal and the discursive foundations together in reconstructing the field on which 
Bitcoin is impacting. 
Historical structures are the fixation of equilibrium of three kinds of forces and 
power resources: material power, ideas and institutions. First, material resources 
are “technological and organizational capabilities […] natural resources which 
technology can transform, stocks of equipment […] and the wealth which can 
command these” (COX [1981] 1981, 137). Ideas, on the other hand, can be of two 
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kinds. First, they are “intersubjective meanings, […] shared notions of the nature 
of social relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behavior” 
(Ibid). Second, they are “collective images of social order held by different groups 
of people [concerning] legitimacy of prevailing power relations, the meaning of 
justice and public good, and so forth” (Ibid.). The third element of an historical 
structure is institutions. Institutionalization is a way to fix in a long-lasting, yet 
not ahistorical and permanent way the set of shared meanings and collective 
images, and to secure one specific distribution of material power (Ibid: 136-7). 
3. Governmentality: Rationalities of Power. 
This project mainly focuses on the second category of forces within historical 
structures and fields, i.e. ideas. My understanding of the role of ideas in shaping 
political power draws on Foucaultian studies on governmentality. In this 
approach, government is defined as “the ‘conduct of conduct’ [i.e.] [a]ny more or 
less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities 
and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that 
seeks to shape conduct by working through desires, aspirations, interests and 
beliefs” (Dean [1999] 2010, 266–67). Power is performed following specific aims 
and according to specific logics. The assemblages of these logics form what 
Foucaultian theories define as governmentality or rationality of government. 
Governmentality is “any relatively systematic way of thinking about government. 
This can include the form of representation for the field to be governed, the 
agencies to be considered and enrolled in governing, the techniques to be 
employed, and the ends to be achieved” (Dean [1999] 2010, 267). 
Governmentality is constructed on three kind of ideas, involving different sides of 
power: ideas about episteme, telos and techne of government and regulation 
(Cutler and Gill 2014a, 316; Dean [1999] 2010). Together, these three sides of 
“mentality of government” answer the three aforementioned questions: what has 
to be governed? Which aims have to be pursued? Which means have to be 
employed? Episteme is the “[body] of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, 
and means of calculation, or rationality [which is] employed in practices of 
governing” (Ibid: 42). Telos of government is the core assemblage of ideas 
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concerning the “type of person, community, organization, society or even world 
which is to be achieved”. In short, telos is the aim, the ends of government. 
Techne, lastly, is the set of ideas on “by what means, mechanisms, procedures, 
instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies […] authority [is] 
constituted and rule accomplished” (Ibid).  
4. Hegemony, Conflict and Change 
For Cox, historical structures can be either hegemonic or non-hegemonic. The 
difference between them is the one “between those in which the power basis of 
the structure tends to recede into the background of consciousness, and those in 
which the management of power relations is always at the forefront” (COX [1981] 
1981, 137). In order for a structure to be hegemonic, all the resources have to be 
firmly in hand of a hegemonic group. However, the struggle over hegemony 
might take place in just one of the various fields of power. Change is 
conceptualized as a successful act of resistance: “To the extent that [people] do 
successfully resist a prevailing historical structure, they buttress their action with 
an alternative, emerging configuration of forces, a rival structure” (COX [1981] 
1981, 135). 
Foucault and the studies on governmentality, on the other side, distinguished 
power structures according to the degree to which the core elements of the 
rationality of power are naturalized and taken for granted, thus considered “true” 
and unquestioned (Dean [1999] 2010; Di Munzio 2014; Foucault 2007; Rose and 
Miller 1992; Schneiderman 2014). For Foucault, every conduct and regime of 
government produces multiple counter-conducts because power, for how strong it 
could be, cannot determine the specific individual behavior of every single 
person. Practices and rationalities of power are always altered, molded, 
reinterpreted by those receiving them. This, however, does not automatically 
bring about change. A pressure for change stems from problematization, i.e. “a 
way of questioning and interrogating past, present and potential alternatives” 
(Dean [1999] 2010, 38). Each regime of government is born by questioning 
previous regimes; it might question itself, and might be questioned. 
Problematization assumes a stronger connotation when it is structured in 
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programmes, i.e. “explicit, planned attempts to reform or transform regimes of 
practices by reorienting them to specific ends or investing them with particular 
purposes. Programmes often take the form of a link between theoretical 
knowledge and practical concerns and objectives” (Dean [1999] 2010, 268). 
Djelic and Quack (Djelic and Quack 2003), on the other side, propose a more 
contingent interpretation of change. They state that the regulatory environment, is 
divided between dominant and fringe players. The former are placed at the core of 
an already regulated arena, and they often take a conservative stance especially 
during periods of stability, working for the preservation of the status quo (Ibid: 
24). Fringe players, on the other side, are actors placed at the periphery of a 
regulated and institutionalized environment, and often their very survival might 
depend upon changes in the current regulation (Ibid). Especially in times of crisis 
and redefinition of authority, fringe players might emerge, and those who already 
are in place might assume a stronger transformative stance, leading the effort of 
reshaping regulation. Some dominant players, in this view, might even detach 
themselves from the hegemonic group and associate themselves with the 
transformative effort, often in order not to lose power in the new scenario. 
Cox and Neogramscian studies considers change as a more systemic and 
integrated process, Foucault and Foucaultian approaches focus more on ideas and, 
lastly, Djelic and Quack and sociological institutionalism focus more on material 
capabilities and institutions. This project will focus on the role of ideas and 
rationalities: regulation of Bitcoin is at a very early stage, thus the material 
capabilities and institutions are on hold for the time being. By understanding the 
underlying rationalities, we will be able to hypothesize how institutions and 
material capabilities will move when the right moment will come. However, we 
have to recognize that these two driving forces are at least partially independent 
from rationalities, and might bring about unexpected developments.  
The theoretical framework has now to be operationalized to the empirical object. 
We have to define the field and the historical structure on which Bitcoin impacts. 
Then, the task of the empirical research will be to determine the discursive and 
ideational content of the historical structure, and to which degree it can be 
 Ludovico Rella 
Master of Science in Global Studies 
Master Thesis in Political Science 
 
20 
 
considered hegemonic. After having done so, we can hypothesize which kind of 
threat and challenge Bitcoin represents to the given historical structure. The task 
of the next section will be to apply the aforementioned theoretical framework to 
the fields of money and finance.  
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III. Operationalization of the Theoretical Framework to the 
Case of Bitcoin. 
Bitcoin is a private currency, thus it impacts first and foremost with the sphere of 
human activity of monetary policy, which is mainly, if not only, ruled by central 
banks (Cohen 1999; Cohen [2008] 2008; Marcussen 2006). However, we should 
not observe only central banks in order to understand the political responses to the 
challenge of Bitcoin. Quite the opposite, we have to ask whether monetary policy 
can be comprehended in a broader field. 
1. The Actor Constellation. 
The first network of relevant actors is the transnational network of central 
bankers. Marcussen’s study of this field allows us to draw some implications, both 
at an institutional and at an ideational level (Marcussen 2006). First, we can see 
how the network grew over during the twentieth century: from 30% of the 
countries having a central bank in 1900, now 90% of the countries have one (Ibid: 
181-2). Second, this network has a deeply hierarchical structure, with OECD 
countries at the center, a “semi-peripheral” group, and a very big periphery 
(Marcussen 2006, 195). Third, the central banks’ tasks and the knowledge to 
perform them have become more and more “standardized”. Central banks are 
often strongly independent from governments and parliaments (Ibid: 182), and 
central bankers are selected often from a very tight number of prestigious 
universities worldwide (Ibid: 187-9). Central banks also produce knowledge, by 
hosting their own Ph.D. programmes and research activities. 
Connected to central banks, we expect banking to be involved in the effort to 
regulate Bitcoin, for several reasons. First, because banking and monetary policy 
are already intertwined. Bankers and central bankers often come from the same 
epistemic community, thus we can also expect them to share the same concerns. 
Second, banks are also deeply concerned with payment systems (Jeffs 2008). 
Banks and banking regulators have shown concerns over non-bank firms which 
are operating on the field of payment systems, such as PayPal (BIS - Committee 
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on Payments and Market Infrastructures 2014). Thus, it seems reasonable to 
retrieve the same concerns over Bitcoin. 
At the political level, banking shows a change in the role of public authority from 
“regulation to supervision” (Tsingou 2008), leaving a very high degree of freedom 
in private actors’ hands. This tendency is fostered by the fact that public and 
private actors share the same education and have several formal and informal fora 
for discussion and socialization (Ibid: 60). The result is a private self-rule that 
strengthens the role of already powerful actors and keeps other players, and 
societal actors at bay. These tendencies does not seem to have changed in 
response to the 2007-08 financial crisis, and some authors claim that this make the 
overall system prone to other future shocks (Rossi 2011). 
Another sensitive policy section is securities and financial instruments. The 
International Organization of Security Commissions (IOSCO) plays a crucial role 
in fostering regulation, standardization and institutionalization in the field of 
finance as a whole. Especially the American Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) can be considered as a domestic player with an almost global reach 
(Botzem 2014; Botzem and Quack 2006; Botzem and Quack 2009). Insurance 
firms might be involved, since Bitcoin raises questions concerning how to protect 
value of those investing and speculating on the value of the currency.  
2. Finance as a Unified Field. 
When it comes to the relationship between monetary policy and banking there is 
evidence showing a pendulum movement between more and less interconnection 
(Marcussen 2006). The first phase goes from the end of the XIX century until the 
Second World War: private actors played a pivotal role in establishing strong 
national currency, redeemable in gold (the so called gold standard), and especially 
in advocating the institution of central banks in order to keep the system stable 
(Gilbert 1999; Gilbert and Helleiner 1999; Zelizer 1999). Private banking and 
monetary policy formed a unified field. 
After the 1929 Great Depression and until the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
framework in the 1970s, states gained stronger and stronger influence over central 
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banks, alongside with a more interventionist attitude towards the economy 
(Leyshon and Thrift 2005, 70–79; Marcussen 2006). This resulted in a partial 
divorce between banking and monetary policy, and an attempt of state-driven 
economic policy to absorb monetary policy. But as soon as the Bretton Woods 
system went down, central banks gained new influence, and got separated from 
economic policy both formally (by establishing the principle of the independence 
of central banks from governments) and substantially (in the way in which central 
banks decide their own guidelines, and coordinate with each other to establish 
them) (Marcussen 2006). 
In the current period, often called neo-liberal (Helleiner 1999), we are witnessing 
a renewed “marriage” of monetary policy and banking (Cohen 1999; Thrift and 
Leyshon 1999). After the collapse of the gold standard, money has lost any kind 
of connection with real goods and has become fiat money, which derives all its 
value from being legal tender within the borders of the state, and from the trust 
given to the issuer (Helleiner 2009). This central role of public authorities, 
however, obscures the role played by private banking industries in granting 
liquidity and money. There is a connection between fiat money and credit money 
(Cohen 1999), that makes banking and monetary policy a materially unified field. 
This independence of central banks from government has brought about the 
relative decrease of relevance of political organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in favor of the Bank of International Settlements and, for 
Europe, the European Central Bank, the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB), and the Eurosystem (Dodd 1999; Marcussen 2006). 
Moreover, this interconnection is based on shared ideas and world-views. The 
community of central and private bankers as a whole share the features of an 
epistemic community, i.e. “a network of professionals with recognised expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy 
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992, 3; Marcussen 
2006). Both public and private bankers are selected through the same channels, 
share the same education (often obtained in the very same universities), and have 
frequent institutionalized and informal occasions to discuss and coordinate 
strategies and policies. Two prominent examples of this coordination are the 
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Group of Thirty (G30), a private network of bankers, and the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) (Marcussen 2006). 
Banking, in turn, is at the center of a broader spectrum of financial activities, 
which encompasses accounting, securities, insurance and many other activities 
(Botzem 2008; Botzem 2014; Botzem and Dobusch 2012; Botzem and Hofmann 
2010; Botzem and Quack 2006; Botzem and Quack 2009). Banks have the 
paramount function of providing credit for those who want to carry financial 
activities. Moreover, the very nature of banks has changed in the last decades: 
banking has witnessed a profound restructuration, the division between 
commercial and investment banks, decided in the aftermath of the 1929 Great 
Depression, has been overcome (Rossi 2011; Vigna and Casey 2015). Now banks 
operate more and more often like finance “supermarkets” (Vigna and Casey 
2015), offering a broad range of financial products (Thrift and Leyshon 1999). 
Thus we see how finance is constructed as a unified, interconnected and 
interdependent whole. 
3. What has to be Studied: Rationalities of Power and Hegemony. 
The main hypothesis of this work is that the main point of friction between 
Bitcoin and the regulatory framework of finance has to be located within ideas 
and rationalities, with material and institutional power being still for the time 
being. Thus, we have to understand the ideational response to Bitcoin from the 
public, private and societal regulators of currency, banking and finance. First, I 
will understand which actors are more active in the attempt to regulate virtual 
currencies, and which ones are absent or isolated. I will, then, see which ideas are 
proposed on telos, episteme and techne. Lastly, I will understand which of these 
ideas are widely shared and hegemonic, and which one are contested. Through 
this analysis I will be able to say if Bitcoin is a threat to the hegemonic 
equilibrium within finance, if the response of the system is hegemonic, and 
towards which direction it is aimed. In order to do that, my methodological choice 
will be Critical Discourse Analysis of official documents issued by the actors. The 
description of the employed method and the criteria of selection of the sample will 
be the aim of the next section.  
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IV. Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis. 
1. The Aim and the Epistemological Stance. 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has the aim to  
“Disentangle the giant milling mass of discourse, to chart what is said 
and can be said in a given society at a given time with regard to its 
qualitative spectrum […] and to uncover the techniques through which 
discursive limits are extended or narrowed down. Last but not least […] 
CDA aims to question and criticize discourses.” (Jäger and Maier 2009, 
36). 
CDA is strongly linked to critical realism, and especially in critical realist 
interpretations of Michel Foucault’s works (Fairclough and Chouliaraki 1999; 
Wodak and Meyer 2009). Critical realism stands for an understanding of social 
reality as built by the dialectic between discursive and non-discursive elements 
(Bhaskar 2008; Brante 2001). Thus, reality is neither completely independent 
from our own mind, nor is it only forged by our interpretation of it (Fairclough 
2009; Fairclough [1995] 2010; Fairclough and Chouliaraki 1999).  
Discourses can construct, disrupt and transform objects and their meanings. 
However, discourse cannot completely obfuscate the autonomy that other 
elements of reality have in shaping boundaries of discourses and meanings. 
Critical realism acknowledges reality as stratified in different levels. A change in 
one level might bring about changes in the others. However, there is not a unified, 
all-encompassing foundation of reality, or a privileged way to access it. Discourse 
is one of the levels of such stratified ontology, but it cannot change the other 
levels of reality alone. This means to acknowledge discourse as a dialectic-
relational element of social life, and a social practice (Bhaskar 2008). This 
epistemological characterization has a practical implication: if we use CDA we 
have to be thorough in providing detailed information on the non-discursive 
background, i.e. the context within which the discourse we want to analyze is 
situated. 
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2. What is Discourse? 
Discourse can be defined as “an institutionalized way of talking that regulates and 
reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (Jäger and Maier 2009, 45; Link 
1983, 60). Discourse is organized in discourse strands: they are defined as flows 
of discourses that center on a common topic (Jäger and Maier 2009). Discourse 
strands are internally subdivided into planes. Discourse planes are the social 
locations in which the discursive practice takes place. Discourse planes, in turn, 
might be divided in sectors. For example political regulation is the discourse plane 
to be analyzed, in its public, private and societal sectors. Discourse strands are the 
sum of fragments of discourse, which are texts in their empirical occurrence. 
Every fragment might cover more than one discourse strand: every fragment in 
which two or more discourse strands are entangled is called a discursive knot. 
3. How Do We Perform Critical Discourse Analysis? 
Now we have to define how to conduct research analysis. This involves two major 
explanations: how to choose the sample of discourse fragments, and how to 
practically conduct the analysis of them. 
a) The Criteria of Sample Selection. 
First, we have to acknowledge that discourse analysis is not based on the idea of 
the representative sample as random selected. The choice of the sample is based 
on the concrete research question and the chosen theory, i.e. it is a theoretical 
sample (Emmel 2013). The aim of theoretical sampling is to add new material 
insofar as it provides new and important theoretical contributions to – or against – 
the main argument which is push forth. This also means that the sampling stops 
when theoretical saturation is reached: theoretical saturation occurs when adding 
new material provides only redundancy (Jäger and Maier 2009). 
My sample will be based on previously collected databases of organizations in the 
field of finance. In particular, Tony Porter and Heather McKeen-Edwards 
(McKeen-Edwards and Porter 2013) produced a list of organizations both at a 
local and at a transnational level in the multiple sub-fields of finance from the 
Yearbook of International Organizations (YIO). I will add to the sample central 
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banks, the G30 and the Institute of International Finance which, from previous 
studies, have resulted as important in regulation of finance (Tsingou 2008). The 
sample will be limited to those papers that represent and express the opinions of 
the organizations issuing them. For this reason, I will exclude from the detailed 
analysis all those papers which explicitly say that they represent only the views of 
the scholars writing them, even though they are hosted and published by relevant 
actors. These papers, anyhow, will be used in the structural analysis in order to 
provide insights on how the relevant knowledge is produced and shared. The 
sample will be narrowed down to the organizations that have issued regulatory 
papers on Bitcoin. 
In order to enlarge or narrow down the sample, two criteria will be followed. 
First, we do not expect to find relevant documents issued by all the actors. Rather, 
the fact that one organization has issued a document on Bitcoin or not will be in 
itself empirical evidence: in the discussion of the collected data, the inactivity of 
some players and the hyperactivity of others will be taken into account as a sign 
of an internal differentiation of the field. Second, the sample might be expanded 
following the principle of the “snowball sample” (Emmel 2013; Vogt 2005): I will 
expand following the network of connections among actors, until the point in 
which theoretical saturation is reached (Bloor and Wood 2006). Thus, my main 
aim will be to have a sufficiently wide, yet non-redundant sample. 
b) The Method of Analysis. 
The analysis is formed by three phases: structural analysis, detailed analysis and 
synoptic analysis (Jäger and Maier 2009, 53–57). With structural analysis I will 
map the field and the actor constellation around Bitcoin and its regulation. First, I 
will list all the chosen texts with bibliographical information, topics covered in 
each text, and literary genre
3
. Second, I will scrutinize the structure of the 
discourse, in order to see how the topic is framed. Third, I will search inter-
discourse entanglement, especially references among sources and connections 
among topics. I will provide a map of the discursive network, based on the 
patterns of quotations and references. In this way I will be able to understand not 
                                                 
3
 All these information are provided in Appendix 1. 
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only which typicalities are used across documents, but also the hierarchy 
established among documents: a text which is referenced more and more often 
contains fragments of discourse which are “borrowed” by others, thus we can 
consider it more representative of the discursive structure as a whole. I will place 
every actor within Abbott and Snidal’s Governance Triangle, in order to 
understand whether one category of actors is mostly concerned with Bitcoin’s 
regulation. 
After we have identified the typical discourse fragments, we have to perform what 
is called detailed analysis (Jäger and Maier 2009). First, I will contextualize the 
sources I will use in the detailed analysis. In particular I will have to legitimize the 
choice of the given fragment. Second, I will explain how the regulators typically 
frame the question in terms of layout, expressive tools, text structure, and the 
topics which are dealt with. Third, I will analyze the rhetorical means employed. I 
will also take into consideration how the actors portray themselves and others, 
which references are made to bodies of knowledge. Fourth, I will unpack the 
content and ideological statements contained in the sources. I will look for 
portrayals of money, the meanings attached to it, which ideas concerning the 
“nature” of money are pushed for, and which ones are rejected. Fifth, other 
peculiarities of the articles are examined. Sixth, and last, I will explain the overall 
message of the article. 
Lastly, we have to perform synoptic analysis (Jäger and Maier 2009, 56), which 
consists in an evaluation and assessment of the results of the structural and 
detailed analysis. In this last step I will synthesize the results of the detailed 
analysis in the light of both the theoretical framework and the structural analysis. I 
will summarize the sub-topics and group them within the categories of episteme, 
telos and techne of regulation. I will then show whether there are patterns of 
rationalities within or across the three groups of public, private and societal actors. 
I will assess the strength with which these rationalities are shared and taken for 
granted, or contested. This will allow me to assess whether the rationalities of 
power over money, and the responses to the challenge represented by Bitcoin are 
conceivable as hegemonic. Lastly, I will say whether the results allow us to 
envision possible future scenarios, and which characteristics they might have.  
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V. Data Analysis and Discussion 
From the first sample (McKeen-Edwards and Porter 2013), I expanded as to 
comprehend all the documents issued by public, private and societal organizations 
within the field of finance. The resulting list, available in full at Appendix 1, lists 
117 documents issued by 92 organizations and agencies. The aim of the following 
sections will be to scrutinize these sources. First, structural analysis will be 
performed across them. Then, detailed analysis will focus only on a small number 
of sources. In the end, synoptic analysis will address the research question by 
detecting the main ideational forces in place, and their possible future directions. 
1. Structural Analysis 
a) The Actor Constellation 
The mapping of the nature of the organizations involved in regulation and actively 
issuing documents concerning Bitcoin shows some typicality. First there is an 
overall absence and isolation of societal actors: only two social movements, 
ATTAC network and OCCUPY movement, have issued documents which in 
some way relate to Bitcoin (ATTAC [2012] 2012; Occupy [2013] 2013). The 
Chartered Financial Analysts Institute (CFA Institute) has interviewed 
Antonopoulos (Jaye 2014), an investor particularly advocating in favor of Bitcoin, 
and this document is the only one showing an interconnection between established 
players and Bitcoin discourse. These three documents are not connected to each 
other, thus, it seems that there is an underlying isolation of societal voices vis-à-
vis the transnational network of regulators. The only societal voice in this matter 
is the one of Bitcoin’s network itself. While it would be interesting to analyze 
Bitcoin’s discourse in its own right, this would require a parallel project and a 
completely new sample. Besides that, I said above that the analysis of the internal 
rationality of Bitcoin has already been scrutinized: the aim of this project is 
precisely to cover the rationalities of established regulators. This project, thus, 
will overlook Bitcoin’s internal discourse. 
A second structural typicality is that, while the actor constellation comprehends 
important private players, a pivotal role is still played by public actors. Of 117 
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documents, 94 are issued by purely public agencies such as central banks and 
regulators of stock exchanges and securities industry, 16 by purely private actors, 
4 by mixed organizations and 3 by societal organizations and movements. 
Table 1 Sample: overall number and division among Public, Private, Societal and Mixed Actors. 
Type of Actors Number of Documents 
Public 94 
Private 16 
Societal 3 
Mixed 4 
Total 117 
I used the software Visone (Visone team 2011), elaborate by the University of 
Konstanz and the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, to visualize the documents as 
nodes (in Figures 8 and 9 they are visualized as dots), and then grouped the nodes 
within the areas of the Governance Triangle. 
 
Figure 8: The Sample of Documents and the Governance Triangle. 
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b) The Discursive Network. 
The discursive network shows a quite strong hierarchy and centrality of a small 
number of documents. Table 3 shows the number of times a given document has 
been cited by different sources. 
Table 2 Core documents and frequency of references 
Paper Citations 
European Banking Authority (EBA) 
(2013 and 2014) 
26 
European Central Bank (ECB) 
(2012) 
19 
Financial Criminal Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN) (2013) 
13 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 6 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) USA 
(2014) 
4 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) USA (2013) 
3 
Goldman Sachs (2014) 3 
Figure 9 shows a graphical representation of the network of sources. I used these 
references as network data and elaborated a graphical representation of the 
connections between the examined texts. In order to do that, I used Visone as in 
Figure 8. The graphical representation visualizes documents as nodes in the 
network, and references among them as ties connecting them. Those ties are 
visualized as arrows pointing from the document citing to the one being cited. I 
personally highlighted the sources I will use in my detailed analysis in a different 
colour. 
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Figure 9: The Discursive Network (my own elaboration via Visone). 
c) The Central Documents. 
First, the 2013 consumer and investors warning issued by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) (European Banking Authority [2013] 2013) and the 2014 official 
opinion paper by the same organization (European Banking Authority [2014] 
2014) are the two most frequently cited papers: combined, they are cited by 26 
other sources. 
Then, the 2012 paper issued by the European Central Bank (ECB) (European 
Central Bank 2012) is cited 19 times in other sources. This paper is important 
because it is the first official paper on virtual currencies. Moreover, the same ECB 
recently issued an update to that paper, titled “Virtual currency schemes – a 
further analysis” (European Central Bank [2015] 2015). This last paper will be 
incorporated as well, even though it is not widely or frequently cited, since it is 
mere continuation of the older document. An important institution such as the 
ECB needed to update its analysis after only three years: this shows how virtual 
currencies are still difficult to grasp and need to be constantly monitored. 
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The third central document is issued by the US-based Financial Criminal 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN). This paper is titled “Application of FinCEN's 
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual currencies” 
(FinCEN [2013] 2013). It was issued in 2013 and it has been cited 13 times. 
The fourth document was issued in 2014 by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), a transnational public organization on financial stability. This document 
mainly related to Anti Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing 
(AML-CTF) (FATF [2014] 2014), and was cited 6 times. 
The fifth document is the so called notice 2014-21 was issued by the US-based 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and it has been cited 4 times (Internal Revenue 
Service, USA 2014). This document is important because it was the first specific 
piece of “hard” regulation concerning Bitcoin. I put hard in quotation marks 
because this paper is not an ex novo, legally binding document, but rather an 
interpretation of the existing regulation and its application to virtual currencies.  
The sixth document is issued by the US local branch of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). This document is mainly concerned with frauds involving 
virtual currencies, it was issued in 2013 and cited 3 (SEC 2013). 
Lastly, Goldman Sachs has recently published a Research Paper in the form of a 
collection of articles and expert interviews on the theme of Bitcoin. This 
document’ has been cited 3 times, with special mention that this has been the first 
attempt of a powerful financial for-profit player to ever issue a paper on the matter 
(Goldman Sachs [2014] 2014). 
However, other sources are worth being mentioned in the discussion. First, some 
documents are too recent to be acknowledged by other sources. One suitable 
example is the “One Bank Research Agenda”, published in 2015 by the Bank of 
England (Bank of England 2015). This document is a very detailed and advanced 
analysis of innovation in finance, money and payment, and the role that central 
banks may play in this changed scenario. Second, other documents will be 
brought into the discussion to show whether and how some understandings of the 
subject at hand varies across types of actors. Thus, other sources will be cited in 
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order to compare the stance across the private, public and societal nature of 
regulators, and to compare and contrast the stance adopted by central documents 
with the one proposed by more “peripheral” sources. Third, some documents are 
not cited by other sources, but they are coming from very important organizations 
and they cite many other sources. Thus, they acknowledge the complexity in the 
discourse, and they can be considered as interesting inter-discursive knots in 
themselves. An example of this is the document issued in late 2014 by the World 
Saving and Retail Banking Institute (WSBI [2014] 2014), which builds its 
analysis upon a review of all the central documents listed here.  
d) The Typical Framing of Bitcoin: Genres and Topics. 
Most of the documents are press releases aimed at warning and informing 
consumers and investors on the possible risks they can run into by engaging in 
virtual currency-connected businesses. Others are papers trying to define Bitcoin 
as a currency, a commodity or just as a means of payment. Others again, are 
policy papers aimed at reviewing the state of the art of regulation on the topic. 
Others, again, are more comprehensive reports, or documents which put Bitcoin in 
a broader perspective. One last group of sources is made by research papers: many 
institutions are hosting and financing academic papers which are aimed at 
defining and understanding what Bitcoin and virtual currencies are about. This 
last group of sources will not be used directly in the analysis, because it is clearly 
stated that they do not reflect the political orientation of the organization hosting 
and funding them. However, they give us the picture of how much the study of 
Bitcoin is considered a technical issue, rather than a political one. A distribution 
of the documents according to their genre is provided in Table 3.  
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Table 3 Genre and Number of Analyzed Documents 
Type of Document Number 
Press Release and Warning 44 
Policy Paper 25 
Speech 16 
Annual Comprehensive Report 15 
Academic Article 10 
Presentation 7 
Total 117 
After reading the documents within the sample and coding the collected material, 
I elaborated a list of the topics and sub-topics the discourse fragments deal with. I 
then organized them into discursive strands connected to the episteme, telos and 
techne of regulation. I will list them here in order to follow better the detailed 
analysis which I will provide in the next sub-section. 
The episteme of regulation is mainly divided into three sub-topics. First, many 
documents are engaged in defining money, its characteristics and functions, and 
its sources of value. This sub-topic comprehends also the effort to understand if 
private money is considered possible or not. The second sub-topic is about how 
much have the regulators to intervene. The third sub-topic is the definition of 
finance as the field that has to be governed: at which level has regulation to be 
adopted, between the national and transnational level. The telos comprehends the 
aims that regulation has to achieve. The main aims are consumer protection, 
promotion of technological innovation, and neutralization of political challenges. 
Finance is recognized as neutral and a-political, and the aim of regulation is to 
preserve it in this way. Within the techne, the option tends to vary more clearly. 
Three strands can however be detected: warning and damage control, the 
interpretative adaptation of existing regulation, and ex-novo, case-specific 
regulation, mostly in the form of business-based licenses. Bitcoin’s inherent 
political element is the most important overlooked topic: Bitcoin is often 
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considered a purely technical innovation in the already existing field of finance, or 
at most an economic anomaly, while only very few actors consider it a political 
player, and regulation of finance as a political activity. The next step will be to 
analyze these topics in detail. 
2. Detailed Analysis 
a) Money, Value and Virtual currencies. 
Within the discursive strand of episteme, the first sub-topic deal with the 
definition of money and its value, in order to understand if private money is 
theoretically possible or not. We can see one widespread and uncontested 
definition of money. Here is a comparison between the understanding of money 
given by EBA and the one acknowledged by the Danish National Bank: 
“In economic theory, money performs three different functions: (1) a unit 
of account, (2) a means of exchange and (3) a store of value.” (European 
Banking Authority [2014] 2014, 12) 
The EBA pictures money as a unit of account, a means of exchange, and a store of 
value. By comparing this understanding with the one provided by national 
regulators, we retrieve the same picture, with differences only in wording. As an 
example, let us take the explanation given by the Danish National Bank: 
“Irrespective of their form, [currencies] have filled three basic functions: 
• They have been widely accepted as a means of payment, i.e. they have 
been used for the purchase and sale of everyday goods and services.  
• They have been used as a unit of account for determining prices of 
goods and services.  
• They have been used as a storage of value, meaning that the purchase 
and sale of goods and services did not need to coincide in time.” (Danish 
National Bank 2014, 86) 
The interpretations of the nature and the functions of money are unanimous. In 
this respect, we can consider these interpretations as hegemonic and naturalized: 
this understanding is not put at the forefront of the power struggle. However, a 
divide appears between two kinds of actors. On one side there are national public 
actors whose understanding of money is delimited to the “basic”, hegemonic 
definition outlined above. On the other side we retrieve transnational public and 
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private actors, and very powerful national actors, such as the Federal Reserve or 
the Bank of England. The difference between these two kinds of actors is not a 
political conflict between two contradictory understandings, but rather a 
difference between a shallower and a deeper analysis of the social roots of money 
and its value. Let us consider this quote from the European Central Bank: 
“Money is a social institution: a tool created and marked by society’s 
evolution” (European Central Bank 2012, 10) 
The Bank of Canada shows a similar understanding of the process of adoption of a 
means of payment as money: 
“At the Bank of Canada we’ve done some experiments in behavioral 
economics to look at what elements determine the success or failure of e-
money. What we find is that adoption of e-money is exactly like the 
tango—it takes two. Buyers need to decide whether to use the new 
payment method while sellers need to decide whether they’ll accept it. It 
turns out that it’s the seller’s side that leads the dance; if there is a large 
enough fraction of sellers accepting new payment methods, more and 
more buyers are prompted to use them, eventually leading to complete 
adoption on both sides.” (Bank of Canada [2014] 2014, 5) 
We can see a much more complex and contextualized conceptualization of the 
role and origins of money. Despite the differences between the latter and the 
former approach to money, we can reconstruct a connection: all the sources 
understand money as something “natural”, thus technical in its management. 
Money “performs functions” (Danish National Bank 2014; European Banking 
Authority [2014] 2014) and emerges from an evolutionary process (European 
Central Bank 2012), and its natural roots can be recreated through social 
experiments (Bank of Canada [2014] 2014). Even when money is a “social 
institution”, its roots are not recognized as political: money emerges purely in the 
separate realm of economics rather than through political decisions. 
Connected to the nature of money is the debate over its sources of value. Most of 
the texts imply that money, even when it is fiat money, has inherent value, i.e. 
value that does not purely derive from the supply and demand of it. Other sources, 
however, acknowledge that money has not such clear an inherent value. What 
creates value, both in gold and in money, are two elements: use and trust. 
Something has value insofar as it is either widely adopted, or as the institution 
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issuing it is widely trusted: “Anything that has currency in this sense is a 
currency.” (Lemieux 2013, 14). 
This is especially important when it comes to the value of fiat money. In this case, 
use and trust intertwine. Legal tender currencies are fiat currencies, thus their 
value does not derive directly from commodities backing them: they derive value 
from compulsory use, and from the trust given to the authorities issuing them. Let 
us see a quote from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago: 
“History certainly offers several examples of currencies used without 
state support, oftentimes because the state-sponsored currency was 
proving deficient. But throughout most of Western history, the state has 
involved itself in money. At a minimum, the state has used money as a 
coordinating device, usually supporting its value by accepting it in the 
payment of taxes.” (Velde 2013)4 
We can see how the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago recognizes the role of the 
State not in establishing money, but in sustaining its value and reinforcing its use 
as a means of payment. The WSBI, a private actor, gives a similar interpretation 
of the relationship between money and the state. Moreover, it deals with fiat 
money, which is a form of money with no intrinsic value besides use and trust. 
“The value of money as a medium of exchange then depends on 
individuals’ expectations that it will be accepted by other people. […] 
Generally, such acceptance was facilitated further when states made a 
money legal tender […]. Eventually most states suspended the 
redeemability of money in favor of “fiat” money, which has no non-
monetary value (it is just paper, or - for coins - low value metal).” (WSBI 
[2014] 2014, 3) 
Trust is assured by the trustworthiness of the state itself, and of the Central Bank 
issuing the currency. Some of the sources explain currency substitution and 
competition as a proof of a deeper crisis of trust in the state, as the private 
investment fund cited below: 
“Not all central banks around the world are trustworthy. The strong 
volatility of certain currencies could prompt users of that currency to seek 
a replacement solution.” (Desjardins Economic Studies [2013] 2013, 5) 
                                                 
4
 Document issued by the Federal Reserve of Chicago (FED CHICAGO in the sample, Appendix 
1) 
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The European Central Bank seems to summarize the discussion about the nature 
and value of money: 
“From a legal perspective, money is anything that is used widely to 
exchange value in transactions. The term currency is used for “minted” 
forms of money; nowadays usually taking the form of coins and 
banknotes. In a more conceptual sense, a (particular) currency refers to 
the specific form of money that is in general use within a country.” 
(European Central Bank [2015] 2015, 24) 
How are virtual currencies understood? What we can retrieve is, again, a 
unanimous understanding: almost all the sources do not acknowledge Bitcoin and 
virtual currencies as money. Let us compare some understandings of Bitcoin: 
“Virtual currencies do not have the nature of a highly liquid asset and 
have not reached the level of acceptance commonly associated with 
money.” (European Central Bank [2015] 2015, 25) 
The Japanese Ministry of Finance (FAS), agrees in not defining Bitcoin as money, 
but bases its conclusion on the fact that BTCs are not legal tender anywhere:  
“I think it is clear that Bitcoin is not a currency because it does not have 
mandatory circulating power” (FSA [2014] 2014) 
The Bank of France, among other national regulators, agrees with the FSA and 
adds new reasons why Bitcoin is not money. Not only virtual currencies are not 
legal tender, but they do not follow the “normal” rules of payment systems, which 
have to rely on funds, normally denominated in legal tender currencies:  
“bitcoins cannot be regarded as a means of payment, or even as electronic 
money, in the sense defined in the French Monetary and Financial Code, 
as they are not issued on the receipt of funds. Moreover, unlike electronic 
money, there is no legal obligation to reimburse bitcoin owners at face 
value and at any time." (Bank of France [2013] 2013, 1) 
Even though the sources agree in defining virtual currencies as not money, we can 
retrieve once again a different level of complexity, between national and 
transnational regulators. National players think that there are legal and economic 
preconditions for money to be money, thus private currencies simply cannot exist. 
Transnational players such as the ECB, on the other side, implicitly consider that 
something that can reach levels of adoption rates and trustworthiness comparable 
with legal tenders, might affirm itself as a currency. To draw a hyperbole, for the 
Bank of France Bitcoin cannot become money, while for the ECB, Bitcoin has not 
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become money yet. One further proof of the theoretical possibility of private 
money is this other quote, again from the European Central Bank: 
“However, the overall situation as regards payment system stability might 
change if: i) large financial sector players interconnected to the global 
banking system started offering services related to VCS
5
; and/or, ii) a 
significant increase in users and the volume of transactions took place 
(for example due to the acceptance of virtual currencies by large e-
commerce merchants). […]In addition, a major internet company could 
decide to issue a centralized VCS to facilitate payments on its platform or 
“community”. These could be payments for digital content, e.g. a newly 
released song, an exclusive video, a high-quality media article, a new 
level within a game, etc. Once a couple of hundred million users keep a 
small balance of VCS units, they could also start using these for 
payments for real goods and services or for person-to-person payments” 
(European Central Bank [2015] 2015, 27) 
We notice two elements from this fragment. First, the European Central Bank 
recognizes that the future developments in transnational finance are only partially 
under its control. For this reason, the discourse assumes a hypothetical tone, and 
the sentences are not enunciated as truth statement, but rather as forecasts and 
future scenarios. Second, the ECB lists the conditions under which virtual 
currencies might make a leap and become a “mainstream” payment instrument. 
First, the issuer should be well connected: this player would already have a system 
of costumers and connections in place that will enable the virtual currency to 
access a widespread use basis. Second, this player should be already trusted in 
other fields: the virtual currency would be able to rely on the “capital” of trust 
with which this new hypothetical player would be endowed, even though it does 
not have the strength deriving from a legal tender status. Again, trust and use are 
the main driving forces behind the value of money. 
b) What Has to be Regulated, and Who Has to Regulate. 
Another element of episteme is the construction of the field that has to be 
governed. Finance is constructed as a unified field, as a complex system with 
several parts playing a vital role within it, and with specific nodal points which act 
as sorts of gatekeepers. Especially banking, stock exchanges and investment funds 
are paramount in order to allow for creation and circulation of money. Here are 
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 Virtual Currency Schemes. 
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some representative quotes from documents in the sample. First, Goldman Sachs 
states that no payment system will be considered reliable without the support of 
an efficient banking system to store funds provide loans, and clear transactions. 
Moreover, since every payment system has risks and BTCs appear to be 
especially risky, hedge funds are needed for investor to protect themselves: 
“The fundamental obstacles to bitcoin [sic] being used more broadly in 
the payments system are arguably not insurmountable, though 
connections with the conventional banking system are ultimately 
essential to its functioning. The absence of derivative markets makes it 
harder to manage and hedge risk around bitcoin’s value, but it is possible 
to imagine how those could ultimately develop.” (Goldman Sachs [2014] 
2014, 6) 
Also the CFA Institute stresses the same point. Without banks providing products 
and accounts denominated in BTCs, it is difficult to imagine that Bitcoin will take 
off as a currency: 
“A major challenge facing Bitcoin is that even when merchants choose to 
accept payments, it is difficult for them to convert bitcoins into fiat 
currencies or store them in deposit accounts. This is due to the reluctance 
of banks to create bitcoin-denominated products.” (CFA Institute [2014] 
2014a, 5) 
Thus, both the CFA Institute and Goldman Sachs show how the building of a new 
payment infrastructure, which is paramount in order to support a currency, has to 
consider the several different functions performed by sub-systems of finance, in 
these cases banking and derivative markets. These intermediaries operate as 
“gatekeepers” of the system as a whole: regulating fluxes and the interactions 
between the system and the surrounding environment, as well as the internal 
wellbeing of the system itself. 
The role of these gatekeepers is keeping negative influxes outside the system; let 
the positive ones in, and allowing for the financial system to work positively for 
“real economy”, thus avoiding systemic crisis to impact with the real economy: 
“In doing so, the EBA contributes to:  
- improving the functioning of the internal market, including, in 
particular, a sound, effective and consistent level of regulation and 
supervision;  
- ensuring the integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning 
of financial markets;  
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- strengthening international supervisory coordination;  
- preventing regulatory arbitrage and promoting equal conditions of 
competition” (European Banking Authority [2014] 2014, 45) 
Bitcoin is treated as a potential systemic challenge for two reasons. First, being 
finance a unified system, anything which impacts on one of the elements make the 
whole system resonate with the consequences of that impact. Second, Bitcoin is 
itself something that spans across several sub-fields: banking, payments, 
investments, currency exchange balance. 
“Overall, the advent of digital ﬁnancial services is likely to change the 
proﬁle of risks across the ﬁnancial system. Almost certainly it will raise 
new risks; it may also arguably make others easier to manage.” (G30 
2014, 25) 
Since Bitcoin is a systemic challenge, the need is for a systemic answer. 
Regardless of their public or private nature, most of the actors vocally ask for a 
regulation which should be transnational in scope, public in nature, and consistent 
across jurisdictions in order to prevent regulatory arbitrage, i.e. the possibility to 
switch jurisdiction in search for a more suitable environment. The first example is 
provided by the public actor EBA: 
“the global, internet-based nature of VCs would require a regulatory 
approach to strive for an international, and ideally global, coordination” 
(European Banking Authority [2014] 2014, 43) 
The WSBI agrees almost word by word with the EBA, showing how the core 
understandings cut across categories: 
“At the very least there should be the ambition for a global, common 
definition and classification of virtual currency.” (WSBI [2014] 2014, 21) 
The CFA Institute, despite coming from the private sector, openly endorses a 
state-based solution:  
“In general, CFA Institute believes that common minimum standards at 
the international level are preferable to a patchwork of potentially 
divergent national regimes in order to minimize scope for regulatory 
arbitrage. […] Experience in other markets suggests market-based 
solutions may be unlikely to completely solve these issues. ” (CFA 
Institute [2014] 2014b, 2) 
This last quote in particular is quite surprising. As I said earlier, finance is one of 
the fields which have witnessed an increasing relevance of private self-regulation 
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(Graz and Nölke 2008b; Hassel 2008). However, CFA states that private self-
regulation would be suboptimal. We can thus say that transnational public actors 
are in a leading position, and will be in the future, both because the higher 
activism of public actors in the effort of regulating virtual currencies, and also 
because the other actors ask for them to be pivots in establishing regulation.  
c) How Much to Regulate. 
In order to determine the regulatory approach that will be followed, many 
regulators recognize that trust is paramount, and that it may be now at stake. Trust 
in regulators can be undermined if regulation is systemically bypassed and 
violated. For this reason the European Banking Authority and the European 
Central Bank have analyzed separately the so called “reputational risks”: 
“The risk can arise if a decision not to regulate was made based on an 
incomplete analysis of the VC risks, or if the decision was insufficiently 
communicated to market participants. The priority of the risk is medium. 
[…] The risk can arise if the analysis of the risks and the identification of 
the regulatory response have been incomplete, if the regulatory approach 
was arbitraged by market participants acting from outside the regulator's 
jurisdiction, or if the regulatory measures chosen were not suitable to 
mitigate the risks. The priority of the risk is medium.” (European 
Banking Authority [2014] 2014, 36) 
For the EBA, reputational risks arise mainly from direct responsibilities. 
Reputation is at stake when the problem is wrongly understood, regulation is 
poorly implemented, and enforcement is not assured. The European Central Bank, 
on the other side, considers reputational risks the ones arising from people 
considering virtual currencies as falling within the reach of public regulators, even 
when this is not true. Thus, public regulators could be blamed for flaws the do not 
have direct responsibility for: 
“If the use of virtual currency schemes grows considerably, incidents 
which attract press coverage could have negative impacts on the 
reputations of central banks, if the public perceives the incidents as being 
caused, in part, by central banks not doing their jobs properly. As a 
consequence, this risk should be considered when assessing the overall 
risk situation of central banks.” (European Central Bank 2012, 45) 
The puzzle for regulators, thus, is how much to regulate in order, on one side, to 
be effective in the desired results and, on the other, not to be considered 
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accountable for flaws and failures. We can see how this concern is especially 
perceived as important by public regulators. Moreover, there is a wide 
understanding that, regardless of the regulatory approach that has to be followed, 
Bitcoin created a precedent, and might have triggered processes of innovation 
with unforeseeable outcomes. The feeling that emerges is that future 
developments are only partially dependent on the regulators’ wills. For this 
reason, and in order to avoid the aforementioned reputational risks, I would 
suggest that future regulation will be cautious and generally permissive.  
d) Which Ends Have to Be Achieved? 
When it comes to the telos of regulation, we have to ask ourselves: to which end 
have Virtual currencies to be regulated? The fact that private money is 
theoretically possible does not imply in any way that it is desirable. Thus, we have 
to analyze which stance is taken by the relevant actors on whether to ban, 
incentivize or limit virtual currencies. Again, the divide between national and 
transnational regulators recurs. There are, however, internal differentiations: the 
same stance taken by national regulators is also endorsed by the transnational 
organization Financial Action Task Force and, partially, by the European Banking 
Authority. On the other side, there are some national regulators that show a more 
“transnational” agenda, such as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. 
Among the national regulators the positions tend to vary quite sensibly, with a 
stronger stance taken by China (European Central Bank [2015] 2015), that has 
issued a prohibition against virtual currencies and their use by standard financial 
actors
6
. Hong Kong is likewise strict (Hong Kong Government [2014] 2014; IEC 
2013a; IEC 2013b), and so are Iceland (SB [2014]) and Russia
7
 (Tessier [2014] 
2014). What unifies the position of almost all the national regulators, with notable 
exceptions is the focus only on one aim: consumer protection. While this 
                                                 
6
 China’s document banning Bitcoin, or at least prohibiting banks and exchangers in dealing with 
virtual currencies, is not available in English, besides some non-official translation. The official 
text is only available in Chinese. Since using unofficial translations would not be reliable, that 
document will be overlooked in the analysis, while the regulatory innovation introduced by China 
is acknowledged. 
7
 Also in this case, no official translation in English or other languages than Russian are available. 
Thus, I will just report the news related to the ban, but I will not use the document issued by 
Russian authorities in the analysis. 
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dimension is shared also by transnational regulators, what is important here is that 
national actors perceive their role as limited only to consumer protection and 
warning. The aim has to be to warn investors and consumers to the unknown 
elements of this disruptive innovation. Let us compare the beginning of some 
documents issued by national regulators, starting with the US-based Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC): 
“The SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy is issuing this 
investor alert to warn individual investors about fraudulent investment 
schemes that may involve Bitcoin and other virtual currencies.” (SEC 
2013) 
The same understanding is provided by the Bank of France, which confirms its 
critical stance towards Bitcoin: 
“Although bitcoins are not currently a credible investment vehicle and 
therefore do not pose a significant threat to financial stability, they do 
constitute a financial risk for those that hold them” (Bank of France 
[2013] 2013, 3) 
The European Banking Authority shows a dual approach. EBA was the first in 
Europe to issue an official warning for the private sector, shortly after the more 
academic paper issued by the European Central Bank. In this warning, the stance 
of the EBA is quite similar to the one of national regulators: 
“When using virtual currencies as a means to pay for goods and services 
you are not protected by any refund rights under EU law offered, for 
example, for transfers from a conventional bank or other payment 
account.” (European Banking Authority [2013] 2013, 2) 
The stance is reiterated in 2014’s paper. However, this second document is much 
more analytical and it has a more systemic approach. Rather than limiting itself to 
the “consumers beware” discourse, EBA is now much more concerned with 
retrieving the causal roots of Bitcoin’s risks: 
“Risks to financial integrity comprise risks of money laundering and 
terrorist financing, as well as financial crime. […] The risk arises because 
market participants are often led by individuals who are not ‘fit and 
proper’. The risk also arises because VC schemes are not confined to, and 
are accepted across, jurisdictional borders [...] The priority of the risk is 
high.” (European Banking Authority [2014] 2014, 32) 
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The European Central Bank continues to unpack the social roots of money by 
comparing the current situation with pre-modern times, in which private money 
was not unthinkable: 
"The existence of competing currencies is not new, as local, unregulated 
currency communities existed long before the digital age. These schemes 
can have positive aspects if they contribute to financial innovation and 
provide additional payment alternatives to consumers. However, it is 
clear that they can also pose risks for their users, especially in view of the 
current lack of regulation." (European Central Bank 2012, 11) 
Especially in the update published in 2015, the ECB shifts the focus on the 
obstacles which might prevent an increase in Bitcoin’s adoption rates. In 
particular, the so called “digital divide”, i.e. the difference between developing 
and developed countries in the access to the Internet. If and when these 
infrastructural flaws are repaired, however, virtual currencies could be a very 
positive improvement in the financial system: 
“For cross-border customer-to-business and person-to-person payments 
across the world, users may consider using VCS as an alternative. 
However, the technical infrastructure and knowledge needed for 
payments with VCS is a barrier. […] However, there is major room for 
improvement [...] and hence a VCS could have the potential to offer a 
better service than traditional providers (banks, money remitters and 
informal remittance systems).” (European Central Bank [2015] 2015, 20) 
The same idea is shared by The Clearing House, a private transnational banking 
and payment system’s organization: 
“Virtual currencies, like other alternative payment products and services, 
have signiﬁcant potential to foster innovation and customer choice” 
(Douglass and Giles 2014, 38) 
Another private transnational organization, the WSBI, shares this view, in which 
Bitcoin can bring about many positive innovations: 
“[V]irtual currency is a development which should not be discarded […] 
Several regulators express a need for moving cautiously in legislating 
virtual currency, for fear of hurting valuable innovation.” (WSBI [2014] 
2014, 21) 
From the first ECB’s statement, we see how the risks are especially linked to the 
lack of regulation, rather than to an intrinsic source of danger. The other three 
sources converge in understanding competition and innovation as inherently 
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positive. These sources see innovation as natural, and as the product of market in 
the unleashing its “creative disruption”. Their role, thus, is more the one of 
“nurturing” innovation than to ban it (CBI [2014] 2014). Moreover, we can see 
how the Bank of England endorses a positive stance and a complex understanding 
of the questions posed by virtual currencies: 
“While existing private digital currencies have economic flaws which 
make them volatile, the distributed ledger technology that their payment 
systems rely on may have considerable promise. This raises the question 
of whether central banks should themselves make use of such technology 
to issue digital currencies.” (Bank of England 2015, 31) 
This stance is actually more open than the one taken by the European Central 
Bank when it spoke about the possibility of a powerful private player issuing a 
digital currency (see above, page 40). Bank of England openly invites regulators 
to learn from Bitcoin and to coopt it in the system. Another national regulator 
which shows an open stance is the Federal Reserve, in its Federal Advisory 
Council: 
“Bitcoin does not present a threat to economic activity by disrupting 
traditional channels of commerce; rather, it could serve as a boon.” 
(FACBG [2014] 2014, 11) 
Two elements emerge as paramount contributions that have to be preserved. First, 
virtual currencies might provide access to money and credit to the “unbanked” 
(Bank of England 2015, 31; FACBG [2014] 2014, 10). These people are living in 
countries in which banking and credit are not developed enough. Thus, we can 
understand as one of the main aims of regulation to continuously enlarge the basis 
of people involved in financial markets. Second, especially cryptocurrencies, with 
their decentralized infrastructure, can provide for a smoother financial market and, 
thus, minimize costs. 
However, we ought not to be misguided and think that the whole discourse strand 
is uncritically open to legitimize virtual currencies (Goldman Sachs [2014] 2014, 
3). Let us see this fragment from Financial Action Task Force’s document: 
“These potential benefits need to be carefully analyzed, including 
whether claimed cost advantages will remain if virtual currency becomes 
subject to regulatory requirements similar to those that apply to other 
payments methods, and/or if exchange fees for cashing out into fiat 
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currency are factored in, and whether volatility, consumer protection and 
other factors limit their potential for financial inclusion.” (Financial 
Action Task Force [2014] 2014, 9) 
This document has a potentially negative stance towards virtual currencies. 
However, even it agrees with the other sources when it comes to the aims and 
objectives of regulation. In particular, it agrees with the need for protecting and 
fostering innovation, and it focuses on a specific application of it: cost reduction. 
Insofar as virtual currencies can maintain the lower costs of transactions, they 
could be a useful innovation. What is questioned is whether virtual currencies are 
able to deliver on the promises of financial inclusion and technological 
innovation. 
In the mind of transnational actors, there are two major aims that have to be 
achieved. First, regulation has to make the players in financial markets learn from 
Bitcoin and its innovative side. This approach can be summarized with “co-
opetition”: a mix of cooptation and competition with distributed private virtual 
currencies. The first generation of virtual currencies such as Bitcoin and the 
altcoins will remain in place but will remain a niche of the overall economy. On 
the other side, big players such as private firms and even Central Banks may 
incorporate the useful innovations of virtual currencies, while discarding too 
dangerous or politically controversial sides. 
“Indeed, “co-opetition” is already a prevalent feature of the current 
payments system. PayPal, for example, both competes and cooperates 
with the current payments ecosystem. […] On net, more than taking off 
as a widely-used alternative currency, it is much more plausible that 
bitcoin [sic] eventually has a significant impact in terms of its innovation 
on payments technology, by forcing existing players to adapt to it or 
coopt it.” (Goldman Sachs [2014] 2014, 18) 
Even though some forecasts seem overly optimistic, these enthusiastic 
interpretations provide clear representations of the telos of regulation in their 
purest version. For example, the WSBI fleshes out several elements of the 
normative, even utopian (Dean [1999] 2010, 44–45) content of regulation, such as 
the completely technical nature of monetary policy, which could be devolved 
completely to computers; and the improvement of economic conditions in 
unstable developing countries: 
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“If economists and central bankers could agree upon optimal monetary 
rules, then it might be possible to design a digital currency that carries out 
these rules automatically. The potential is there to supply the foundation 
for monetary regimes that do not require oversight by any monetary 
author yet are capable of providing such changes in the money stock as 
may be needed to achieve a high degree of macroeconomic stability. 
Whilst this may not sound appealing to countries with stable currencies, 
some say that citizens from Argentina or Zimbabwe would have 
benefited from adopting Bitcoin as their nation’s currency. […]Finally, a 
virtual currency-like technology platform could enable central banks to 
migrate cash from a physical to a digital form factor – thus significantly 
reducing the cost of cash to society.” (WSBI [2014] 2014, 8) 
What is surprising here is that a national public regulator openly endorses many of 
the utopian elements outlined by private actors (Dean [1999] 2010, 44–45). The 
Bank of England shows that some national players seem to perceive themselves as 
more “transnational” than purely national.  
“For example, making central bank money widely available could have 
an impact on deposits held at commercial banks and a knock-on effect on 
the banking system. Another relevant issue is the impact that offering a 
new method of settlement in central bank money would have on existing 
payment systems.” (Bank of England 2015, 31) 
The relevance of the Bank of England and its stance towards Bitcoin is 
particularly important: the Bank of England is not only a very important national 
actor, but it played an especially important role in the European and global 
process of standardization of payment systems (Jeffs 2008). 
The second aim of regulation is de-politicization: for Bitcoin to serve as a useful 
technological innovation, its political side has to be neutralized. If Bitcoin remains 
“political”, it will remain a niche and die of internal consumption. If, on the other 
side, Bitcoin is “neutralized”, it could become what Internet has been in the past 
twenty years: neutral, technical innovations with huge positive repercussions and 
promising pathways ahead. 
“An analogy they often give is the impact that file-sharing had on the 
music industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, as has been 
the case with the music industry, it is unlikely that the new technology 
will meet the lofty socio-political goals of its proponents. It is more likely 
that Bitcoin will force incumbents in the financial industry, including 
regulators, to adapt the way they do business.” (CFA Institute [2014] 
2014a, 9) 
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There is a connection between the episteme and the telos of money: if Bitcoin has 
to be neutral, this is also because money itself has to be neutral (Polanyi [1944, 
1957] 2001; Schneiderman 2014). As we said above, finance is considered a 
purely technical field, and money as a neutral, natural instrument: 
“In an economy hypothetically dominated by Bitcoin, its finite number 
(21 million) would prevent the application of traditional monetary policy 
tools to provide support in a downturn or reduce growth during excessive 
expansion.” (FACBG [2014] 2014, 11) 
Monetary policy is not seen as a “political” tool, but rather the employment of a 
technical tool and a technical characteristic of money, in order for it to flow better 
in the real economy in case of economic distress. 
e) How to Regulate: the Technical Tools to be Adopted. 
We have seen how money is acknowledged, how Bitcoin impacts on it, and to 
which ends it should be regulated. Now we have to understand the techne of 
regulation, i.e. the technical tools, instruments and strategies through which the 
aims of regulation are achieved. While the characteristics of future regulation are 
shared by the actors (it has to be public, transnational, and consistent), there is no 
widespread agreement of the tools that have to be employed. One can retrieve 
three discursive strands in this field. The first group is the biggest in size. Once 
again, these actors are most often national public regulators, with the notable 
exception of the Financial Action Task Force. These regulators limit their 
intervention to consumer protection and due diligence. 
"Financial institutions, virtual commodity dealers or operators, or 
individuals are reminded of their statutory duty to report suspicious 
transactions to the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit [...] A failure to 
disclose [...] may amount to an offence [...]." (Hong Kong Government 
[2014] 2014, 2). 
These regulators share a vision of their role that is limited to supervision and 
support in case of accidents and other distress experiences by costumers and 
investors (Danish National Bank 2014; Hong Kong Government [2014] 2014; 
MNB [2014] 2014; National Banken [2014] 2014). Law enforcement (FATF 
[2014] 2014; FinCEN [2013] 2013; SEC 2013) is recognized to be difficult for the 
technical characteristics of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, such as anonymity and 
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deterritorialization. Thus, the need is for more monitoring before issuing case-
specific regulation the regulatory effort (MAS [2014] 2014a; MAS [2014] 2014b).  
The second approach is inspired by parallelisms between Bitcoin and other 
technological innovations in finance and other fields. These sources propose 
either to expand existing regulation in other fields in order for it to incorporate 
virtual currencies, or to implement regulation inspired by the same principles and 
using the same tools. In this respect, Bitcoin is called by some actors as “the 
Interned of money” (FIA [2014] 2014). 
The first paper by the European Central Bank tried to understand whether either 
the EU Electronic Money Directive (2009/110/EC) or the Payment Services 
Directive (2007/64/EC) could effectively cover virtual currencies. The final 
answer, however, has been negative in both the cases (European Central Bank 
2012). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the US has likewise 
stated that bitcoins are not securities under current regulation, thus they do not fall 
within the scope of SEC’s power (SEC 2013). Similarly, the US Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) tried to incorporate Bitcoin in the tax regulation framework, by 
considering it as a commodity, and by treating exchanges between bitcoins and 
other currencies as commerce. Using BTCs for buying good, on the other hand, is 
considered barter by the IRS, because it represents an exchange between two 
commodities (Internal Revenue Service, USA 2014). This last attempt has been 
too recent to assess its real impact. As suggestive parallelisms and metaphors may 
be, it seems that there is no previous regulation that seems to suit virtual 
currencies in an effective way (Central Bank of Cyprus [2014] 2014; CFA 
Institute [2014] 2014a; DNB [2014] 2014; FSMA [2014] 2014a; FSMA [2014] 
2014b). 
A third approach is currently gaining momentum. This approach is inspired by the 
so-called BitLicence, implemented by the New York State Department of 
Financial Services (NYS - DFS 2014). The idea is to implement a specific license 
for virtual currency operators such as merchants accepting them, exchangers, and 
investors in virtual currencies. This license compels to disclose the amount of 
virtual currency hold by the operators, as well as the identity of those using the 
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operator’s services, and to keep enough legal tender funds as to cover for possible 
losses experiences by the clients. Many sources now propose case-specific 
licenses as a way out (Douglass and Giles 2014; ICBA [2014] 2014; WSBI [2014] 
2014). The European Banking Authority proposed to institutionalize governance 
authorities within each virtual currency:  
“The governance authority should be accountable for the overall 
functioning of the scheme that promotes the (initiation of the) payment 
instrument in question, and for ensuring that all the actors involved 
comply with the scheme’s rules. Moreover, it is responsible for ensuring 
the scheme’s compliance with oversight standards” (European Banking 
Authority [2014] 2014, 39). 
This approach seems promising for many actors, but flaws have already been 
outlined. Licenses, with their requirements in terms of disclosure of identities and 
accounts will need software corrections in Bitcoin. As I said in the Introduction, 
changes in the code require consensus within Bitcoin’s network: It is difficult to 
think that changes which are hardly compatible with Bitcoin’s political 
propositions will be accepted. As a response, Bitcoin’s users, miners and 
developers might implement measures to “isolate” users of Bitcoin which decide 
to adhere to the new system of licensing. On one side, a regulation which 
completely overlooks Bitcoin’s political elements seems difficult if not 
unsustainable. On the other, Bitcoin seems hardly governable at all, since it has 
almost always the capacity to adapt and dodge adverse regulation. This is an 
example of this skepticism:  
“Already there are reports that traders are working on arbitrage strategies 
for these “New York” bitcoins. It is possible that the bitcoin market will 
experience a phenomenon similar to that of the Argentinian “blue-dollar” 
exchange rate, which sees the USD trade at a premium to the official 
Central Bank rate. In this way, the BitLicence-bitcoin exchange rate may 
end up resembling a quasi-official “New York” exchange rate for 
bitcoin.” (CFA Institute [2014] 2014a, 8) 
It seems again that future developments will fall at least partially outside 
regulators’ reach and control. Thus, unforeseen changes might happen without 
authorities being able to avoid or stop them. 
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3. Synoptic Analysis 
The aim of the synoptic analysis is to summarize the results in order to address the 
research question. As said earlier, governmentality is the system of rationalities of 
power, and it is organized around who rules (the actor constellation), what has to 
be ruled (episteme), towards which end (telos) and with which means (techne). 
When it comes to the actor constellation, the analysis outlines a landscape in 
which public actors are in a leading position, both because their intensive 
intervention in the matter, and because even private actors are calling for public 
intervention and state-based regulation. There is an almost complete absence and 
isolation of societal actors in the debate. This is interesting, although not 
surprising: other authors have showed elsewhere that finance is a field in which 
civil society is often ruled out from important debates and decisions (Tsingou 
2008, 60). In general, the leading position in the discourse is assumed by those 
actors which are either very central in the financial system (US and British 
national regulators such as SEC, FinCEN and the Federal Advisory Council of the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and the Bank of England; and a private 
actor such as Goldman Sachs) or transnational in nature (The Clearing House, the 
Financial Action Task Force, the World Saving and Retail Banking Institute) or 
both (European Central Bank, European Banking Authority). This centrality, in 
turn, is reinforced by the request coming from many peripheral actors for a 
transnational, consistent regulatory framework. 
The episteme of the proposed regulation, as I showed in the detailed analysis, is 
widely hegemonic and spans across public and private actors. Central to this 
episteme is the idea that finance is more than a collection of economic activities: 
finance is a unified and organic field. Money, in this respect, performs “natural” 
functions in this system that have to be preserved, such as circulation and 
exchange. Overall, the understanding is of finance as a deeply technical and 
“neutral” system, and regulatory intervention has to be equally neutral: it has to 
preserve the core functions of the system, and to unleash its full potential for 
innovation. In this respect, a divide emerges which is not really a difference in the 
stance adopted, but rather a difference in the depth of the analysis. National 
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regulators, on one side, maintain a more clear-cut stance in which money is only 
what is established as a legal tender, thus consider private currencies impossible. 
Transnational regulators, on the other hand, are more open to the possibility of 
private money. Rather they assume that Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are 
not money yet. 
The differences between national and transnational regulators are reflected in the 
telos that regulation has to fulfill. Again, the national regulators take and keep a 
much more cautious stance towards virtual currencies and private money. Some of 
them have openly banned Bitcoin, and on average the idea is that investors and 
consumers have to be warned against potential risks. The transnational actors, on 
the other side, take a more permissive stance, and they clearly privilege 
innovation over fear for risks: the system as a whole has plenty of room for 
learning from these new innovations. This form of learning is described as “co-
opetition”. The aim of regulation should be to welcome whichever innovation that 
may increase the fluidity of exchanges, reduce transaction costs, and enlarge the 
basis of those to whom is given an access to the transnational financial system, by 
including the “unbanked” and the non-connected to the internet. 
The second element of telos is much more subtle, and it interacts with the political 
elements inherent to virtual currencies. Again, we can retrieve a cleavage between 
national and transnational regulators. Most of the documents retrieved in the 
sample overlook completely the political roots of Bitcoin and altcoins, together 
with the links between the emergence and diffusion of virtual currencies and the 
lack of trust in the regulatory framework in finance brought by the crisis. This is 
already a sign that virtual currencies are not acknowledged as a political element. 
Most national regulators overlook anonymity as a resistance to deep scrutiny by 
public and private authorities, deterritorialization as a way to overcome the digital 
and economic divide, and peer-to-peer transactions as a way not to rely on 
intermediaries which have proven to be not always trustworthy. Rather, they only 
focus on the technical side: these are not political propositions which may or may 
not be compatible with the status quo, but are anomalies and risks that have to be 
managed and normalized. 
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The few regulators that actually acknowledge these links are transnational actors. 
These documents acknowledge some or all the political sides of Bitcoin. 
However, these political claims have to be normalized in order for virtual 
currencies to be accepted as new elements of the financial system. Finance, 
apparently, is not considered a field open for political struggles, so Bitcoin and 
altcoins are allowed only insofar as they provide “neutral” technical 
enhancements to core functions of the exchange system: higher velocity of 
money, broader access to credit and liquidity, and lower costs and higher 
efficiency by reducing the number of intermediaries involved. 
Previous studies on finance acknowledged two powerful ideational forces, aiming 
towards “scientization” and “marketization”. “Scientization disciplines and 
rationalizes the chaotic uncertainties of social environments, facilitating the 
creation of articulate rule systems, so that social actors can organize to deal with 
them” (Drori and Meyer 2006, 31). Marketization, on the other side, is the neo-
liberal idea pushed forth by the Chicago School and the Austrian School, 
especially Ludwig Von Mises and Friedrich Hayek (Djelic 2006). Marie-Laure 
Djelic (2006: 60-1) identifies six elements of marketization: (1) the endorsement 
of the mathematical modeling of economic phenomena, thus claiming for 
economics to be a “hard science” in its capability to explain human behavior (2) a 
claim for the public, political role of the economist (3) a belief in markets as 
instruments through which to reach greater efficiency, collective prosperity and 
individual freedom (4) the idea that a market without state intervention is self-
sustaining and prone to reach a win-win equilibrium (5) the conception of human 
beings as rational actors whose aim is to maximize utility (6) reconciling 
economics and politics insofar as the economists were deeply engaged in detailed 
policy making. These two driving ideational forces seem to be at play in the 
tendency to consider finance as a neutral, a-political field, which has been 
retrieved in the analysis of the documents. 
This tendency within the actor constellation to consider finance as technical and 
neutral, and to depoliticize challenges, confirms the mainstream way of dealing 
with Bitcoin within academia. As I have pointed out at the beginning of the thesis 
in the literature review, Bitcoin has been framed so far only as a technical 
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element. Moreover, I have shown how important academic research is for 
regulators. As I said in the structural analysis, there is a consistent group of 
documents which are academic papers sponsored by public or private 
organizations. We can see then three elements: 1) a continuity of thought, and a 
mutual permeability, of economic scholarship and regulators of finance, 2) a 
central role of regulatory authorities in issuing research paper and, thus, in 
producing knowledge and 3) a generalized agreement on scientization and 
marketization. This, in turn, confirms what stated by Marcussen and other 
scholars, who recognize finance not only as a unified field, but also as an 
epistemic community (Djelic 2006, 69–70; Gill 2014; Marcussen 2006).  
The techne reproduces the same national-transnational divide retrieved in the 
episteme and telos. Some public national regulators have performed an explicit or 
implicit ban of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies. However, most of the other 
actors have adopted a different stance, regardless of their public or private nature. 
Most of the actors advocate for a regulation which has to be public, transnational 
and consistent. Again, the national-transnational divide is in place: many national 
regulators are stuck to a regulation made of “consumers beware” warnings, and 
legal actions against fraudulent use of virtual currencies. Many transnational, 
public and private actors, on the other side, are increasingly taking a stance which 
is based on licensing virtual currency operators and disclosure of data. Sometimes 
this approach clashes against the core political reasons that brought Bitcoin to life, 
such as with disclosure against anonymity, and establishment of governance 
authorities against peer-to-peer horizontal networks. In opposing technical versus 
political aims, this regulatory approach shows once more that the idea is to de-
politicize monetary issues as much as possible, neutralize virtual currencies and to 
reduce them to pure technological innovation. 
Again, licensing appears to be in line with co-opetition as a model of coexistence 
between virtual currencies and standard players in the financial system. The idea 
is that original virtual currencies will remain niches, while the protocols and ideas 
will find fruitful ground in established actors in the financial markets. The aim, 
thus, is to allow for private actors to adopt standards and protocols from virtual 
currencies, which might in turn trigger further technological innovation and foster 
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market efficiency. The door is somehow open even to the possibility of private 
virtual currencies, if issued by economic players which are stronger than Bitcoin. 
There is an important remark to make: the future will depend only partially from 
the will of powerful players, and all the transnational regulators admit it. The 
possibility of private currency, while not openly endorsed, is implicitly admitted. 
The requirements for “real”, relevant virtual currencies to emerge would be a 
powerful, well-connected issuer, in order to provide a wide basis of use and to 
have an already established trust basis to draw upon. The ECB envision big bank 
and credit institutions or internet companies as the most likely to be the future 
issuer of virtual currencies. This acknowledges the fact that Bitcoin has created an 
important precedent on the transnational level, and it is difficult to think to “de-
invent” what has already be invented (Jaye 2014), or to stop this invention to 
spread and gain momentum. Thus, we need to continue monitoring and see 
whether this leap of quality will take place, if important players are moving in 
order either to endorse Bitcoin, or to issue new independent virtual currencies. 
This means that the struggle over virtual currencies and private money is far from 
being over, but the field of struggle will most likely change: from ideas, 
discourses and rationalities, new developments will happen within the field of 
material and institutional resources of power. As said before in the theory section 
of this thesis, an interesting theoretical framework could be Djelic and Quack’s 
(Djelic and Quack 2003). They divide the actor constellation in dominant and 
fringe players. The former act to secure the status quo, the latter might be 
triggered by a crisis of the system into advocating reform. Acknowledging that the 
future is not only in the hands of regulators means that we have to observe future 
developments in search for fringe players gathering around Bitcoin or altcoins in 
order to protect them, or dominant players securing their own source of power by 
issuing their own virtual currencies, or simply discouraging the adoption of virtual 
currencies as wholes. 
Let us remember that a field is considered hegemonic when the management of 
power is not questioned, and the common understandings around episteme, telos 
and techne are naturalized. Is Bitcoin a counter-hegemonic project? Is it perceived 
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in this way? Which kind of response is being given? Overall, it seems that Bitcoin 
as such is a counter-hegemonic project (as said above in pages 9-11). However, 
the system seems able to push back this attempt to subvert or change the power 
structure. The response seems adaptive and hegemonic: the field is strong enough 
to co-opt some technical elements while removing any political problematization, 
thus being able to continue “business as usual”. Only the future can tell if 
Bitcoin’s network will grow in size and relevance enough as to pose a challenge 
to the hegemonic understanding of transnational finance. Once again, this kind of 
development will most likely take place in the field of material power and 
institutions, rather than on the discursive level.  
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VI. Conclusions. 
This thesis had the aim to unpack the rationalities of power around the 
transnational regulation of money, and how these rationalities are mobilized and 
changed by the emergence of virtual currencies. I moved from the idea that 
monetary policy had to be considered in its wider entanglements with banking and 
exchange, thus in its broader situatedness within the field of finance. I said that, in 
order to understand the rationalities of regulators, we had not only to delve into 
law and hard rules, but to watch at a wider sample of soft regulation and more 
informal documents. Moreover, and especially suitable for the field of finance, I 
had the need not to stop at national public regulators, but to enlarge the focus as to 
catch all the important public, private and societal players. Moreover, the need 
was to understand how strongly hegemonic these rationalities were across the 
actor coalition. The aim this analysis was to understand what was supposed to be 
regulated, how and towards which ends, i.e. episteme, techne and telos of 
regulation. 
The fact that regulation of Bitcoin is still in its infancy was both a challenge and 
an added value of this research: especially in the early stages of regulation, a 
focus on the rationalities of power is needed, more than an assessment of the 
material outcomes. By understanding how rationalities of power are crystallizing 
around the issues raised by virtual currencies, I provided an analysis which could 
be able to envision possible future scenarios and draw possible pathways of future 
development. The analysis of the network of documents showed an almost 
complete absence of societal voices in the debate, a centrality of public actors, 
and, in general, a leading role taken by transnational actors on one side, and very 
powerful national actors, on the other. 
The analysis has provided a picture in which there is somehow a divide between 
national public regulators on one side, and transnational or very relevant national 
players on the other. This cleavage seems to explain more of the differences in 
stances than the public-private one. This cleavage does not concern the basic 
concepts within the episteme, but rather the depth of the analysis. National 
regulators are overall more cautious on protecting sovereign currencies. Virtual 
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currencies are not accepted as money because they are not legal tender. 
Transnational regulators, on the other side, acknowledge that money has value 
insofar as it is used and trusted. Private money, thus, is theoretically possible. 
However, both national and transnational regulators recognize that Bitcoin is not 
money, at least not yet. 
The telos of regulation is twofold. First, regulation ought not to jeopardize 
important technological innovations associated with Bitcoin. Regulation should be 
inspired by “co-opetition”: on one side, virtual currencies should be co-opted as 
technological innovations. On the other side, competition between different 
virtual currencies has to be accepted and even incentivized. Second, regulation 
has to keep political programs aside from finance, its institutions, functions and 
flows. National regulators do not acknowledge at all the political causes and 
implications of Bitcoin and virtual currencies. The political elements of these new 
players are downgraded from political challenges to risks and anomalies. 
Regulators have to warn in order to minimize risks and control damages. 
Transnational regulators, on the other side, take a more active stance. 
The techne of regulation is more divided. National public regulators have less 
clear ideas than transnational public and private actors. Among this latter group of 
regulators, the idea is to establish ex novo, case-specific licenses. The 
requirements in terms of disclosure of clients’ identities and accounts, as well as 
the tracking of transactions are against the political principles underpinning the 
emergence of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies. This, in turn, is a further 
confirmation of the willingness of the regulators to de-politicize virtual 
currencies. However, this is also a sign that the widespread idea is not to ban them 
altogether. 
As many sources have stressed, the need is for constant monitoring of future 
development of both regulation and virtual currencies as a phenomenon. As said 
above, virtual currencies have proven to be quite resilient and adaptive, so there is 
no final say about whether they will stay here or fade away. This study has 
produced two important findings. First, private money is not completely removed 
as an option at an ideational level. Second, the struggle for the practical 
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establishment of private money will move from the ideational level of power to 
the material: in the future, attention will have to see whether and how economic 
players are making use of their material resources to issue, incentivize or 
discourage virtual currencies. However, the idea that virtual currencies will just 
vanish seems unlikely: “The environment (an increasingly peer-to-peer, sharing 
and digitalized economy) is too favorable for the concept to vanish” (WSBI 
[2014] 2014, 21). As has been put: “What the future will look like is unclear, but 
it is increasingly less likely to look like the present” (CFA Institute [2014] 2014a, 
9). 
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VIII. Appendix 1: The Sample of Analyzed Documents and 
Coding. 
In this Appendix are listed all the documents analyzed. For every document, I 
provide the acronym and the full name. For organizations having issued more than 
one document used in the sample, I attach a number in order to make every 
document univocally identifiable. Moreover, the acronym has an embedded link 
to the website where the given document can be retrieved. All the documents are 
listed with a definition of their genre (press release, policy paper and so on). 
Moreover, a list of keywords, topics, sub-topics and omitted elements is provided 
for each source. Lastly, I show all the references made by each document to 
others, starting from which I reconstructed the discursive network shown in 
Figure 9. 
Appendix 1: Sources
Acronym Organization Country Type Genre Typicality Neglected Inter-discourse entanglement Sub-topics References
2AMF
Autorité des 
marchés financier
France PU Report
Classification of regulatory 
framework
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2013; ECB, 2012; 
GOLDMAN 
SACHS, 2014; 
ACCENTU
RE/FCA/PS
R
Accenture, 
Financial 
Conduct 
Authority, 
Payment System 
Regulator (FCA 
subsidiary)
UK MIX Presentation charts, bullet points, diagrams Currency, Politics Internet, Technology Innovation, Payment systems, Internet, IRS, 2014
ACPR
Autorité de 
Contrôle 
Prudentiel
France PU Position statement EBA, 2014
AFM
Authority for the 
Financial Markets
Netherlands PU Press Release
Regulatory vacuum, Consumer 
protection,  Risks, Bitcoin as an 
investment and a speculative asset
Bitcoin's politics, currency
Regulation, Consumer Protection, 
Financial Security, 
Regulation, Consumer Protection, Financial Security, EBA, 2014
AMF
Autorité des 
marchés financier
Canada 
(Quebec)
PU Guidelines Questions and Answers,  
Positive sides, innovation, political 
implications
Finance, currency, technology, law 
enforcement and crime
Risk (Volatility, Liquidity, Technological and Operational, Legal, Money Laundering, 
Terrorism), explanation, Money, Technology, Speculation, Legal tender
ATMIA
ATM Industry 
Association 
WorldWide PR Position statement
Classification, clarification, 
expression of a position, regulatory 
approach, conundrums
Bitcoin's politics
Technological change, Consumer 
protection, private self-regulation
Regulatory complexity, Regulatory uncertainty, need for international coordination, future 
scenarios (Bitcoin has potential), best practices and self-regulation, creative disruption, 
ATMIA as a gate keeper, consumer protection
EBA, 2014
ATTAC ATTAC network Worldwide SO Proposal reform, examples, critiques
Monetary reform, Franction Reserve Banking System, Local Exchange Trading System, 
Credit Coin, Electronic Community Currencies, Credit and Banking, Complementary use 
of cryptocurrencies
BAFIN
Federal Financial 
Supervisory 
Authority
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Enumeration
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protection, Law Enforcement
Bitcoin's politics, Regulatory approach (Bitcoin as a financial instrument, and as a 
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Questions and Answers, Historical 
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Bitcoin's politics, regulatory 
approach
Technological change, Consumer 
protection
Definition of money (money=unit of account, store of value and means of exchange), 
Definition of Bitcoin and cryptocurrency, Bitcoin/money comparison (Bitcoin is not 
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BCB
Banco Central de 
Bolivia
BO PU Bullettin
BCC
Banco Central de 
Cuba / Cuba 
Central Bank
Cuba PU Report
Money Laundering, Law 
enforcement, Bitcoin's definition 
and functioning, explanation 
questions
Money Laundering, Law 
enforcement, Bitcoin's definition 
and functioning, explanation 
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BDF
Banque de 
France / Central 
Bank of France
France PU
White paper/focus 
paper
Definition of bitcoin and virtual 
currency, description of its 
functioning, distinction from 
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Risks, Charts, Figures, Anecdotes, 
Map of the regulation thus far
Finance, Consumer Protection, 
Law Enforcement, Internet
Money, Financial security, Consumer Protection, Financial Regulation (Electronic Money, 
Payment Systems, Investments and Speculation)
ECB, 2012, 
FinCEN, 2014, 
FATF, 2014
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BDI
Banca 
d'Italia/Bank of 
Italy
Italy PU Circular-Report EBA, 2014
BDI2
Banca 
d'Italia/Bank of 
Italy
Italy PU Speech Regulation Bitcoin's politics, Monetary policy, Finance, Risk, Investments, Speculation, EBA, 2014
BDI3
Banca 
d'Italia/Bank of 
Italy
Italy PU Warning
Definition of virtual currencies, List 
of Risks, Transnational comparison, 
National regulation assessment
Bitcoin's politics, regulatory 
approach
Law enforcement, Risk( 
Speculation, Fraud, Hacking, Loss 
of value, Lack of protection ) 
Commerce, Investment, Financial stability, consumer protection
FATF, 2014; EBA, 
2014
BDLR
Banco De La 
Repùblica
CO PU
Press Release - 
Guideline
Assertive, Bullet point, prohibition Anything but monetary policy
Currency, Monetary Policy, Law 
Enforcement
Currency, Monetary Policy, Law Enforcement
BDM
Banco de 
Mexico/Bank of 
Mexico
Mexico PU Warning
Risk list, consumer protection, 
payment systems
BDP
Banco de 
Portugal
Portugal PU Presentation
Bullet points, Comparisons, 
Classifications, Graphs (Blockchain)
Finance, currency, technology, law 
enforcement and crime, taxation
Risks (Lack of transparency and accountability, incomprehension of the phenomenon, Lack 
of certainty of the acceptance of Bitcoin as a means of payment, Loss of value, volatility, 
reputational risk, risks for enterprises, illicit activities, fiscal evasion, risk of loss of 
confidence towards regulators, if the system does not work, need for a global 
answer), Advantages (no intermediaries, no costs, irrevocability, simplicity in transnational 
transactions, growth, unbanked), Political factors (confidence in the financial system 
through anonymity and absence of intermediaries)
ECB, 2012; EBA, 
2014; FinCEN, 
2013; FATF, 2014
BF Bank of Finland Finland PU Report
Numerical data, anecdotes, 
explanations
Money
Politics, Technology and 
Innovation, Internet, 
Technology (anonymity, P2P, proof-of-work, centralized ledger, mining), Exchange (rates, 
means), Actor constellation (Internet subculture, WikiLeaks), Risks (theft by hacking, 
volatility)
ECB, 2012
BJ Bank of Japan JA PU Speech
Cautious optimism, Incentives 
rather than deep comand-and-
control legislation
Politics Payment system, banking Payment system, banking
BM
Bank of 
Mauritius
MSZ PU Speech Enthusiasm, hyperboles Politics, Law Enforcement National Interest Innovation, Payment systems, Internet, Finance, Currency
BM2
Bank of 
Mauritius
MSZ PU Letter to Stakeholders Caution, warning, reluctancy Politics Speculation, Investments, Finance, Law Enforcement
BNM
Bank Negara 
Malaysia / 
Central Bank of 
Malaysia
Malaysia PU Warning
Risks, definition of money and 
currency, definition of virtual 
currency, uncertainty concerning 
regulation
Proposed regulation, Bitcoin's 
politics
Risks, definition of money and 
currency, definition of virtual 
currency, uncertainty concerning 
regulation
Risks, definition of money and currency, definition of virtual currency, uncertainty 
concerning regulation
BOC Bank of Canada Canada PU Academic ECB, 2012
BOC Bank of Canada Canada PU Academic ECB, 2012
BOE Bank of England UK PU Academic
BOE Bank of England UK PU
Research report and 
research agenda
Exploration and preliminary 
analysis, benefit analysis, risk 
assessment
Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's network, 
systemic regulatory approach
Technological change, payment 
systems, payment systems, 
political side of protocols, 
technical expertise, conduct, 
Technological Innovation, International Coordination, Central Bank's autonomy in issuance 
of money, Regulatory approach, Technical expertise, Political economy of protocols, 
Financial Conduct, inter-bank competition, payment system, banking, honest behavior,
BOF Bank of Finland Finland PU Press Release
Assertive, Consumer protection 
discourse
Bitcoin's politics
Consumer Protection, Financial 
stability, payment system
Currency, Monetary Policy, Payment System, Financial Stability
BOI
Bank of 
Indonesia
Indonesia PU Statement Assertive Bitcoin's politics
Law enforcement, definition of 
momeny
Currency, Risks
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BOI Bank of Israel Israel PU Statement
Regulatory complexity, further 
research, risks
Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's network, 
systemic regulatory approach
Inter-institutional coordination, 
regulatory complexity, research, 
expertise, law enforcement, 
consumer protection, financial 
stability, economics, financial 
interconnectedness
Inter-institutional coordination, regulatory complexity, research, expertise, law 
enforcement, consumer protection, financial stability, economics, financial 
interconnectedness
BOT Bank of Thailand Thailand PU Explanation
Risk list, consumer protection, 
definition of Bitcoin
Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's network, 
systemic regulatory approach
Consumer protection, IT Risk list, consumer protection, definition of Bitcoin
BRC
Banco de la 
Repùblica de 
Colombia
Colombia PU Research
Mathematical model, higly 
formalized economic language and 
structure, formulas, hypotheses 
over money, assets and finance
Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's network, 
systemic regulatory approach, 
consumer protection
Risks, economic theory, economic 
models, political economy, 
economic policy, money, assets, 
speculation
Risks, economic theory, economic models, political economy, economic policy, money, 
assets, speculation
ECB, 2012
BSP
Bangko Sentral 
ng Pilipinas / 
Philippines' 
Central Bank
Philippines PU Research report
Regulatory vacuum, Warning, 
Consumer Protection, Definition of 
Bitcoin, Definition of currency, 
Bitcoin's politics, regulatory 
approach
Law enforcement, Risk( 
Speculation, Fraud, Hacking, Loss 
of value, Lack of protection ) 
Law enforcement, Risk( Speculation, Fraud, Hacking, Loss of value, Lack of protection ) 
CBC
Central Bank of 
Cyprus
CY PU Press Release Bullet points, explanation Politics
Internet, Technology, Criminality, 
Law Enforcement
Risk, IT, Internet
CBI
Central Bank of 
Ireland + Gareth 
Murphy
Ireland PU Speech
Future scenarios, possible 
regulation, financial crisis, questions 
and answers, political economy of 
money
Bitcoin's politics
Law enforcement, consumer 
protection, technological 
innovation
Political economy of money, regulation, regulation process, regulatory approach, consumer 
protection, public-private relationship, expertise, law enforcement
ECB, 2012, 
CBJ
Central Bank of 
Jordan
Jordan + 
Worldwide
PU Presentation
Exploration and preliminary 
analysis, benefit analysis, risk 
assessment, slides, anecdotes and 
examples
Bitcoin's politics
Technological change, payment 
systems, development, developing 
countries and economies, political 
economy of payments and 
remittances
Remittances, the unbanked, opportunities, developing countries, political economy of 
payments and remittances, third party applications over Bitcoin, alternative use and 
channels to Bitcoin, Bitcoin's network: (M-PESA, bitPESA, Kipochi)
CFA CFA Institute Worldwide PR
Answer to public call - 
 HM Treasury, UK
Questions and answers, future 
scenarios, regulatory approach, 
complexity, internationalization
Bitcoin's politics
Fiancial stability, law enforcement, 
crowdfunding, technological 
innovation and finance, Internet
Benefits of digital currencies, political economy of protocols, financial field 
interconnectedness, need for systemic regulation, international interconnectedness, 
international coordination, consumer protection, financial stability, technological 
innovation, trust in money and finance, private self-regulation vs. public regulation, impact 
of digital currencies, Bitcoin's network
FinCEN
CFA2 CFA Institute Worldwide PR Policy Paper
Questions and answers, explanation 
of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, 
regulation comparative analysis, 
pros and cons, risks, anectdotes, 
technical language, lists of altcoins, 
financial interconnectedness, future 
scenarios
A clearcut regulatory proposition
Technological Innovation, 
International Coordination, 
International comparison, 
Financial field interconnectedness, 
Political economy of payments, 
financial intermediaries, regulatory 
approach, Bitcoin's politics, 
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and protocols, political economy 
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regulatory approach, Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's and Altcoin's networks, Financial stability, 
security, Law enforcement, banking, Altcoin's and protocols, political economy of 
protocols,
IRS, 2014, EBA, 
2014, SEC, CFTC, 
CFPB
Consumer 
Financial 
Protection 
Bureau
USA PU Report Anectdotes, Questions and Answers Money, Politics
Technology, Internet, Law 
enforcement and crime
Risks (Hacking, Lack of protection, Costs, Scams and frauds), Trust (in public issuers of 
money, in public regulators of finance, do you trust private, non-regulated operators?), 
Costs (transactions, risks)
IRS, 2012, FATF, 
2014, FinCEN, SEC
CH
Helvetic 
Confederation
CH PU Offical Notice
CRA
Canadian 
Revenue Agency
Canada PU
Press Release - 
Guideline
Definitions, interpretation of the 
legislation to date and how to apply 
it to Bitcoin
Currency, Politics, Monetary Policy Commerce and Barter Commodities, Tax Laws, Barter, Commerce
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CSBS
Conference of 
State Bank 
Supervisors
USA MIX Policy Paper
Ad hoc intervetion, ad hoc task 
forces, 
Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's network, 
technological innovation, protocol
Consumer protection, financial 
stability, law enforcement
Regulatory environment, multi-stakeholder regulation, regulatory approach, definition of 
virtual currency, assessment of previous regulation
GAO, 2014
DBB
Deutsche 
Bundesbank
DE PU Speech Dismissive Politics, Law Enforcement Finance, Speculation Risks, Currency, Speculation, Finance
DENMARK 
 BANK
Denmark Central 
Bank
Denmark PU Monetary Review anecdotes, definitions, charts, Bitcoin's network Technological innovation
Definitions, characteristics and functions of money; Bitcoin's political element; Consumer 
Protection; Episteme, Telos and Techne; Role of Trust in Monetary policy; Regulation and 
regulatory approach; Law Enforcement
EBA, 2013
DESJARDI
NS
Desjardins Worldwide PR Economic viewpoint
anecdote, chart, forecasts, pros and 
cons, definitions and explanations
Technological Innovation, 
International Coordination, 
International comparison, 
Financial field interconnectedness, 
Political economy of payments, 
financial intermediaries, regulatory 
approach, Bitcoin's politics, 
Bitcoin's and Altcoin's networks, 
Financi
Bitcoin network; Technological Innovation, Bitcoin's political element; Role of Central 
Banks; Definitions, conditions and functions of money; Commodity vs Fiat money; 
Financial Crisis; Financial Interconnectedness; Value of Money; Consumer Protection; 
Future scenarios; Speculative bubbles; Role of Trust; Episteme Telos and Techne; 
Regulatory approach
DNB
De 
Nederlandsche 
Bank/ Central 
Bank of the 
Netherlands
NL PU Report
Explanations, anecdotes, some 
hyperboles
Politics, 
Internet, Technology, Finance, 
Law Enforcement
Payment system, banking, currency, Internet, thecnological innovation
DNB2
Danmarks 
Nationalbank/Da
nish National 
Bank
Denmark PU Press Release
Definitions, Graphs, Authoritative 
sentences, reference to the 
european system
Bitcoin's politics Money, Consumer protection
DNB3
De 
Nederlandsche 
Bank/ Central 
Bank of the 
Netherlands
Netherlands PU Press Release Consumer Protection Anything but consumer protection Consumer Protection Consumer Protection
DNB4
De 
Nederlandsche 
Bank/ Central 
Bank of the 
Netherlands
Netherlands PU Bullettin
warning, anecdote, definitions, 
example, explanations, 
comparisons, parallelisms, data
Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's network, 
regulatory approach
Virtual currencies vs. fiat currency, Virtual currencies vs. legal tender, impact assessment, 
payment systems, technological innovation, innovation as positive and natural, IT 
definitions and technical side, risks (security, IT, consumer protection, legal protection, 
volatility), law enforcement, Bitcoin is not money (and will not be), warning
EBA
EBA
European 
Banking 
Authority
EU PU Annual Report
Forecasts, warnings, consumer 
protection discourse
some politics Finance Risks, Payment system, financial stability, investments, securities, some politics
EBA2
European 
Banking 
Authority
EU PU Warning
parallelisms; questions and answers; 
explanation; 
Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's network, 
Financial crisis
Role of Banking as gatekeeper; Bitcoin as proxy for all the virtual currencies; Need to 
educate the public; Law Enforcement; Taxation; Fiat currency vs. Virtual currency; Risks 
(volatility)
ECB, 2012
EBA3
European 
Banking 
Authority
EU PU Opinion Paper
anecdote, parallelism, charts, 
explanation, definitions, forecasts, 
history, pros and cons, comparisons
Definition, conditions and functions of money (episteme), barter vs. commerce and finance, 
risks, IT, technological innovations, Bitcoin's network, Bitcoin's political element, 
Assessment of the regulatory approaches (ban unfeasible, minimun capital and reserve 
requirement is better), need for global, state-based, transparent and consistent regulation 
(Techne and Telos), competition, consumer protection, growth (Telos), Cooptation of 
Bitcoin, Consumer due diligence (Episteme and Telos), Definitions and elements of virtual 
currencies, Innovation as "natural" economic and social phenomenon; European context, 
Financial interconnection, Regulatory approaches, theory of value, Trust, Virtual currency 
vs commodity currency, fiat currency and legal tender; Innovation as natural and 
irreversible; Episteme, Techne and Telos; Need for global, state-based, organic regulation; 
Investor and Consumer protection; Systemic risk; Reputational Risks; Crisis and distrust
ECB, 2012
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ECB
European 
Central Bank
EU PU Speech skepticism, wait-and-see, Politics Economic policy, monetary policy Payment system
ECB2
European 
Central Bank
EU PU Analysis Paper
anectdotes, graphs, examples, 
explanations, parallelisms, history, 
comparisons, datas, pros and cons, 
hypothetical thinking, forecasts
Technology; Law Enforcement; 
Consumer Protection; 
History of Money, Nature of Money, Monetary Policy, Currency, State and sovereign 
power, technological innovation, payment systems, internet, Bitcoin's Network, Bitcoin's 
Political and Theoretical foundations, Crisi and distrust, Virtual Currency vs. commodity, 
commodity-backed, fiat and legal tender currencies; Future scenarios; Pros and Cons; 
Bitcoin is not money (but it is a close alternative); Reputational Risks; Consumer 
Protection; Role of Banking and Credit; Adoption; Trust; Actor Constellation; System; 
Systemic risk
ECB3
European 
Central Bank
EU PU
Analysis Paper, 
Update of Previous 
Research
anectdotes, graphs, examples, 
explanations, parallelisms, history, 
comparisons, datas, pros and cons, 
hypothetical thinking, forecasts
Technology; Law Enforcement; 
Consumer Protection; 
History of Money, Nature of Money, Monetary Policy, Currency, State and sovereign 
power, technological innovation, payment systems, internet, Bitcoin's Network, Bitcoin's 
Political and Theoretical foundations, Crisi and distrust, Virtual Currency vs. commodity, 
commodity-backed, fiat and legal tender currencies; Future scenarios; Pros and Cons; 
Bitcoin is not money (but it is a close alternative); Reputational Risks; Consumer 
Protection; Role of Banking and Credit; Adoption; Trust; Actor Constellation; System; 
Systemic risk
ECB, 2012; EBA, 
2014; FinCEN, 
2013; FATF, 2014; 
Goldman Sachs, 
2014
EFTA-
ATMIA
Electronic Funds 
Tranfer 
Association - 
Automated 
Teller Machine 
Industry 
Association
WorldWide 
(USA)
PR Joint Press Release Wishful thinking, optimism Bitcoin's politics Digitalization, monetary policy Payment systems, technological innovation, cash/e-money relationship
EP Eesti Pank Estonia PU Article ECB 2012
FAC
Federal Advisory 
Council - Federal 
Board of 
Governors
USA PU Meeting minutes
Characteristics, Risks, Regulation, 
Bullet points
Definition of Money
Finance, Risk, Investments, Speculation, Payment System, Banking, Economic Policy, a bit 
of Bitcoin's politics
FinCEN 2014, IRS 
2014
FATF
Financial Action 
Task Force
Worldwide PU Analysis Paper
anecdotes, parallelisms, definitions, 
explanations, hypothetical thinking
Bitcoin's politics, financial crisis
Technology and Internet, 
Innovation, Law enforcement, 
International crime, Consumer 
Protection
Technological innovation, altcoins, Bitcoin as a proxy, Risks, Internet, need for further 
research, e-money vs virtual currency, functions of money, functions of virtual currencies, 
governance authorities, need for common categories and terminology, Law enforcement, 
Money laundering, terrorism
ECB, 2012
FCA
Financial 
Conduct 
Authority
UK PU Interview/Debate
Examples, News, Informations. 
Uncertainty
Politics banking banking, financial assets, exchange rates EBA, 2014
FCA
Financial 
Conduct 
Authority
UK PU Press Release EBA, 2014
FCA2
Financial 
Conduct 
Authority
UK PU Feedback comments
Questions and answers, 
Declarations of intent
Politics
Internet, Technology, Innovation, 
Currency and Monetary Policy, 
Transnational coordination of 
regulatory policies
Possibilities, Innovation, Technology, 
FCA-AIRFA
Financial 
Conduct 
Authority - 
Association of 
Independent 
Risk and Fraud 
Advisors
UK PR Survey
Formal, synthetic, practicitioner-
oriented answers
Politics, Internet, Law Enforcement Payment system
FCA-EDC
Financial 
Conduct 
Authority - 
Edgar Dunn 
Company
UK PR Survey
Lengthier expressions, but still 
executive and practicioners-oriented
Politics, Internet, Law Enforcement Payment system
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FCA-EPA
Financial 
Conduct 
Authority - 
Emerging 
Payments 
Association
UK PR Survey Definitions, example, propositions Politics Payment system, Currency, International Politics
Goldman Sachs, 
2014
FED - 
Chicago
Federal Reserve - 
 Chicago
USA PU Academic
Explanation of Bitcoin, Definition 
of virtual currencies, Definition of 
money, governance of money, 
regulation of Bitcoin
regulatory approach
Political Economy of Money, 
Bitcoin's politics, IT system of 
Bitcoin, Risks, Flaws Consumer 
Protection, Possible future 
scenarios, Technological 
Innovation
Political Economy of Money, Bitcoin's politics, IT system of Bitcoin, Risks, Flaws 
Consumer Protection, Possible future scenarios, Technological Innovation
FED 
BOSTON
Federal Reserve, 
Boston
USA PU Presentation
explanations, bullet points, 
anecdotes, history, comparisons, 
parallelisms, definitions, data, 
forecasts, charts
regulatory approach
Technology, altcoins, technical 
expertise, innovation, creative 
disruption
Economic theory, theory of value, digitalization, technological innovation, mobile 
payments, payment systems, Episteme (markets, competition, efficiency, requirements for 
money and payments), Telos (trustworthiness, smoothness, velocity, efficiency), financial 
interconnectedness, intermediaries, banking and credit, crisis and distrust, Bitcoin's political 
and theoretical foundations, learning from Bitcoin, co-opetition
ECB, 2012
FED 
BOSTON 2
Federal Reserve, 
Boston
USA PU Academic
FED 
BOSTON 3
Federal Reserve, 
Boston
USA PU Presentation
anecdotes, charts, definitions, 
forecasts, explanations, 
parallelisms, history
Bitcoin's politics, financial crisis, 
Bitcoin's network
Technology, altcoins, technical 
expertise, innovation, creative 
disruption
Functions of money, technological innovation, protocols, barter vs. commerce and 
exchange, Role of Trust, Lack of common shared definitions, positive attitute, creative 
disruption
ECB, 2012; 
FinCEN, 2014
FED 
DALLAS
Federal Reserve, 
Dallas
USA PU Presentation
definitions, explanations, imagines, 
bullet points
Consumer protection, Bitcoin's 
political and theoretical 
foundations, crisis and distrust, 
financial interconnectedness, 
financial stability, functions of 
money, intermediaries, Bitcoin vs. 
money, technical expertise, need 
Consumer protection, Bitcoin's political and theoretical foundations, crisis and distrust, 
financial interconnectedness, financial stability, functions of money, intermediaries, Bitcoin 
vs. money, technical expertise, need for research, technological innovation, Role of Trust, 
security, 
FED ST 
LOUIS
Federal Reserve, 
St Louis
USA PU Presentation
definitions, explanation, positive 
attitude, historical comparison
Bitcoin's network
Law enforcement, consumer 
protection, technological 
innovation
altcoins, bubbles and assets, Bitcoin's political and theoretical foundations, how and how 
much to regulate, regulation and regualtory approach, financial interconnectedness, 
intermediaries, crisis and distrust, exchange rate, virtual currency vs. ordinary currency, 
evolution of money, innovation as natural and evolutionary
FI
Finansinspektione
n
Sweden PU Document Consumer Protection Bitcoin's politics, Monetary policy, Finance, Risk, Investments, Speculation, EBA, 2014
FIA
Future Industry 
Associations
INT PR Article
Methaphores (Gold, Internet of 
Money), figures, 
Technology and Innovation, 
Internet, Gold and commodities, 
Trust
Internet (Internet of Money, you cannot shut Bitcoin down as much as you cannot shut the 
Web down), Money (Bitcoin as a gold-like commodity, as a proxy for distrust towards 
financial institutions), Trust, Currency (all the fiat currencies are witnessing a trust issue)
FIN-2013-
G001
Financial 
Criminal 
Enforcement 
Network
USA PU
Regulation, 
Interpretation
definitions, explanations , 
parallelism, history
Bitcoin's network, Bitcoin's politics, 
financial crisis
Technology, economic theory, law 
enforcement
definition of currency, definition of virtual currency, exchange, Functions of money, 
history, issuer, money transmission services, money transmitter, parallelism, users, Virtual 
currency vs. legal tender, virtual currency vs fiat currency
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FINMA
Swiss Financial 
Market Authority
Helvetic 
Confederatio
n
PU Fact sheet
definitions, explanations , 
parallelism, history
Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's network, 
Financial crisis
Technology, consumer protection, 
payment systems
Growing interest, Risks, Consumer protection, law enforcement, positive attitude, currency 
exchange, payment system, regulatory approach (licensing), Technological innovation
FINMA 2
Swiss Financial 
Market Authority
Helvetic 
Confederatio
n
PU Warning
definitions, explanations , 
parallelism, history
Bitcoin's politics, Bitcoin's network, 
Financial crisis
Technology, consumer protection, 
payment systems
Growing interest, Risks, Consumer protection, law enforcement, positive attitude, currency 
exchange, payment system, regulatory approach (licensing), Technological innovation
FKTK
Financial and 
Capital Market 
Commission
Latvia PU Press Release EBA, 2014
FKTK2
Financial and 
Capital Market 
Commission
Latvia PU Press Release
Regulatory vacuum, Consumer 
protection, definition of 
(virtual)currency, Risks
Bitcoin's politics
Regulation, Consumer Protection, 
Financial Security, Currency
Regulation, Consumer Protection, Financial Security, Currency
EBA, 2014, ECB, 
2012
FMA
Finanzmarktaufsi
cht/ Financial 
Market Oversight
Austria PU Press Release
Factlist, warnings, consumer 
protection, unclarity of the actual 
regulation around Bitcoin
Bitcoin's politics, Monetary policy, Risk, Money, Consumer protection, Law Enforcement EBA, 2014
FRB
Federal Reserve 
Board
USA PU Article*
Data, graphs, figures, questions, 
models
Legal, Political and Regulatory 
Implications
Technology, Cryptography, 
Internet, Monetary Policy
Cryptography, Technological Innovation, Internet, Monetary Policy (Exchange Rates, 
Velocity, Liquidity)
GAO, 2014; ECB, 
2012; EBA, 2014; 
ICBA, 2014
FS
Finanstilsinet/The 
 Financial 
Supervisory 
Authority of 
Norway
Norway PU EBA, 2014
FSA
Financial Service 
Agency/Minister 
of Finance
Japan PU
Press conference - 
minutes
Uncertainty Definition of money (problem) Regulation (problem)
FSA2
Financial Service 
Agency/Minister 
of Finance
Japan PU
Press conference - 
minutes
Uncertainty, urgency
Bitcoin's politics, transnationality of 
the issue
currency definition, money 
definition, regulation
currency definition, money definition, regulation
FSA3
Financial Service 
Agency/Minister 
of Finance
Japan PU
Press conference - 
minutes
Uncertainty, no definition of any 
regulatory approach
Bitcoin's politicts, proposed 
regulation
Definition of currency, uncertainty about regulation, 
FSMA
Financial 
Services and 
Martke Authority
Belgium PU
Press 
Release/regulation
Assertive, prohibition, warning, 
consumer protection discourse
Bitcoin's politics, definition of 
money, monetary policy, definiton 
of virtual currency, virtual currency, 
currency, proposed regulation
financial stability Finance, speculation, financial crisis, consumer protection, risks, FSMA - NBB
FSMA-NBB
Financial 
Services and 
Martke 
Authority - 
National Bank of 
Belgium
Belgium PU Joint Press Release
Uncertainty, risk list, bullet points, 
definition of virtual currency, 
absence of regulation, warning
Bitcoin's politics, definition of 
money, monetary policy, regulatory 
strategy
Fiancial stability
Definition of money (problem) Regulation (problem), Speculation, financial stability, 
consumer protection, consumer warning,Risks
EBA, 2014; ECB, 
2012
G30 Group of Thirty Worldwide PR Research/Policy paper
anecdotes, charts, impact 
assessment, 
Innovation, creative disruption, 
taxation
banking as nexus and gatekeeper, adoption, trust, should Bitcoin be regulated? How? How 
much? Risks, Financial interconnectedness,financial crisis and distrust, globalization and 
transnational reach of the challenges, industry and field boundaries, lack of regulation, 
sovereignty, learning with bitcoin, innovation as natural and evolutionary, systemic risks, 
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GAO
Government 
Accountability 
Office 
USA PU Policy Paper
anecdotes, explanations, 
assessment, comparison, pros and 
cons
Bitcoin's politics, financial crisis
Innovation, creative disruption, 
taxation
Bitcoin's definition and characteristics, consumer and investor protection, financial 
inclusion, intermediaries, law enforcement, need for global, state-based, coordinated and 
consistent regulation, Telos (safety and soundness), potential benefits, positive attitude, the 
unbanked, can Bitcoin be regulated? how? how much?
CFPB, 2014, 
FinCEN, 2014, 
SEC, 2013
GOLDMAN 
 SACHS
Goldman Sachs
USA+World
wide
PR Research Paper
Explanations, definitions, 
anecdotes, Economic models, 
Economic theory, charts, figures, 
data, comparisons, parallelism, 
history
“co-opetition”, adapt it or coopt it, adoption, alternative uses of the protocol, 
banking,bitcoin and gold,bitcoin as a commodity, bitcoin is not money, Bitcoin's political 
element, blockchain, chicken-and-egg-problem, commodity money, co-opetition, 
cooptation, Definitions, detractors, detractors vs supporters, disruption, figures, future 
scenarios, gatekeepers, gold, history, Intermediaries, investment funds, Lack of regulation, 
Law enforcement, legal tender, merchants, money, payment systems, political economy of 
protocols, protocols, Regulation, regulation issues, security, Security Concerns, store of 
value, virtual currency vs fiat currency, volatility,
HKGOV
Hong Kong 
Government
Hong Kong PU Press Release
Warning, allarming tones, 
repetitions, intimations
Politics
Law enforcement, Internet, 
Consumer Protection, Currency 
and Monetary Policy
Risks (Monetary loss, money laundering, cyber-crime, speculation), Consumer Protection
ICBA
Independent 
Community 
Bankers of 
America - The 
Clearing House
USA + 
Worldwide
PR Policy Paper
anecdotes, Bitcoin as proxy, Charts, 
definitions, explanations, 
parallelisms, 
Bitcoin's politics, 
Banking, Regulatory approach, Bitcoin's Network, Definition of money+virtual currency, 
Bitcoin IS money, Impact assessment, Financial Internconnectedness, Episteme, 
Intermediaries, issuers,  need for coordination and global approach to regulation, payment 
systems, law enforcement, consumer protection, risks
FinCEN, 2014
IEC
Investor 
Education Center
Hong Kong MIX Report
Repetitions, news reminders, 
anecdotes, very simple 
explanations, allarming tones
Currency, Politics
Law enforcement, Internet, 
Consumer Protection
Risks (Monetary loss, money laundering, cyber-crime, speculation)
Hong Kong 
government, 2014
IEC2
Investor 
Education Center
Hong Kong MIX Report
Repetitions, news reminders, 
anecdotes, very simple 
explanations, allarming tones
Politics
Law enforcement, Internet, 
Consumer Protection, Currency 
and Monetary Policy
Risks (Monetary loss, money laundering, cyber-crime, speculation)
Hong Kong 
government, 2014
IIF
Insitute of 
International 
Finance
Worldwide PR Analysis Paper
anecdotes, history, explanation, 
definitions, parallelisms, charts, 
figures, data
advantages of regulation,banning, bitcoin as a commodity, Bitcoin network,Bitcoin's 
political element,central banks,central issuer,Chart,Consumer protection ,Definitions, 
detractors vs supporters,explanation,Intermediaries,intra-state uncoordinate regulation 
(USA),Intrinsic value ,IT,IT risk,Lack of regulation,Law enforcement, need for 
consistency in regulation, need for state regulation,positive, pseudonymous,RISKS ,tacit 
approval,tacit ban ,Telos,Trust,trusted third-party,volatility,Bitcoin as proxy,definition of 
virtual currency,difficulty of impact assessment,disclosure,exchange,exchange 
rate,gatekeepers,legal tender,Miners,questions,taxation,virtual currency vs fiat 
currency,virtual currency vs legal tender
FED CHICAGO
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IRS
Internal Revenue 
Service
USA PU
Interpretation and 
Regulation paper
Question and answers, parallelisms, 
comparisons
Protocols, Bitcoin's network, 
Bitcoin's political element, financial 
crisis
Payment system, banking
Bitcoin as proxy definition of virtual currency difficulty of impact assessment disclosure 
exchange exchange rate FinCEN For federal tax purposes, virtual currency is treated as 
property. gatekeepers legal tender Miners questions taxation techne Under currently 
applicable law, virtual currency is not treated as currency that could generate foreign 
currency gain or loss for U.S. federal tax purposes. virtual currency vs fiat currency virtual 
currency vs legal tender
FinCEN
LB
Lietuvos Bankas 
/ Central Bank of 
Lithuania
Lithuania PU Document EBA, 2014
LB Latvijas Banka LV PU Press Release
LB2 Latvijas Banka LV PU Press Release
MAS
Monetary 
Authority of 
Singapore
Singapore PU Press Release
Regulation, Risk, historical 
reconstruction, 
Definition of Money, Monetary 
Policy, Bitcoin's politics
Finance in general, consumer 
protection, financial stability
Money laundering, law enforcement, risks, criminal uses, consumer protection, 
transnational scope of regulation
MAS2
Monetary 
Authority of 
Singapore
Singapore PU
Parliamentary debate - 
 minutes
Examples, figures, historical 
anecdotes
Bitcoin's politics
Definition of money, law 
enforcement, tax policy
Money laundering, law enforcement, risks, criminal uses, consumer protection, 
transnational scope of regulation, definition of virtual currency
MAS
MAS3
Monetary 
Authority of 
Singapore
Singapore PU
Analysis Review 
Paper
Explanations, definitions, 
educations, examples, comparisons, 
anecdotes
Consumer protection financial stability increased interest innovation IT Law enforcement 
pros and cons RISKS Technological innovation
MFSA
Malta Financial 
Services 
Authority
Malta PU
Press Release - 
Guideline
EBA, 2014
MNB
Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank / Central 
Bank of Hungary
Hungary PU
Analysis Review 
Paper
Definitions and explanations
Bitcoin's political elements, 
Bitcoin's network, Regulatory 
approach
banking Consumer protection 
decentralization Definitions 
explanation Financial 
interconnectedness innovation 
Intermediaries IT IT risk Lack of 
regulation Law enforcement 
RISKS Systemic Risk taxation 
techne Technological innovation
banking Consumer protection decentralization Definitions explanation Financial 
interconnectedness innovation Intermediaries IT IT risk Lack of regulation Law 
enforcement RISKS Systemic Risk taxation techne Technological innovation
NBKR
National Bank of 
the Kyrgyz 
Republic
Kyrgyzstan PU Warning
Risks, definition of virtual currency, 
lack of regulation, consumer 
protection, prohibition, description
Bitcoin's politics, proposed 
regulation, definition of money
consumer protection, law 
enforcement, financial security
Definition of virtual currency, uncertainty concerning regulation, consumer protection, law 
enforcement, financial speculation
NY 
BITLICEN
CE
New York State 
Department of 
Financial Services
USA PU Regulation
Definition, regulation, 
conceptualization
Bitcoin's political elements
Banking, exchange, law 
enforcement
Consumer protection cybersecurity risks definition of virtual currency disclosure 
exemptions Fiat money Law enforcement legal tender material change minimum capital 
requirements network supervision techne Telos transaction disclosure Trust virtual 
currency business activity
OSC
Ontario Security 
Commission
Canada 
(Ontario)
PU Vademecum
Risks, examples, uncertainty, 
questions and answers, warnings, 
Bitcoin's politics, proposed 
regulation, definition of money
Consumer protection, law 
enforcement
Definition of (virtual) currency, uncertainty about regulation, consumer protection, law 
enforcement
P&R Payden & Rygel
WorldWide 
(USA)
PR Bullettin
Enthusiasm, hyperboles, hope. 
Graphs and figures, examples and 
anecdotes, examples from history 
(Pre-industrial and proto-industrial 
history)
Bitcoin's politics
Deterritorialization, globalization, 
internet, technology
History of Money, Nature of Money, Monetary Policy, Currency, State and sovereign 
power, technological innovation, payment systems, internet
ECB 2012
RBNZ
Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand
NZ PU Speech wait-and-see Politics payments payment system
SBI
Sedlabank 
Islands / Iceland 
Central Bank
Iceland PU News, warning
Regulatory vacuum, Rejection of 
competence on the matter, Risks, 
warning
Bitcoin's politics, regulatory 
approach
Law enforcement, Risk( 
Speculation, Fraud, Hacking, Loss 
of value, Lack of protection ) 
Law enforcement, Risk( Speculation, Fraud, Hacking, Loss of value, Lack of protection ) 
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SEC
Securities and 
Exchanges 
Commission
USA PU
Warning, Regulation, 
Interpretation
Warning, questions and answers, 
education, explanation, definition 
and conceptualization
Bitcoin's political element, financial 
crisis
Law enforcement, fraud, crimes, 
consumer protection
anonymity Consumer beware fraud increased interest investor alert Law enforcement 
licensing regulatory apprach RISKS warning
SFC
Securities and 
Finance 
Commission
Hong Kong PU Circular
Assertive, regulation, orders, 
procedures
Bitcoin's politics, definition of 
money, monetary policy, definiton 
of virtual currency, virtual currency, 
currency, proposed regulation
Law enforcement Money laundering, law enforcement, anti terrorism, consumer protection IEC
SOCIETAL
CFA Institute 
Magazine
Worldwide SO Interview/Debate
Pros and cons, definitions, 
comparisons, parallelisms, 
explanations, exaples, anecdotes, 
history,
Adoption as key for money altcoins alternative uses of the protocol As an invention, it 
happened and you can’t un-invent it. banking Bitcoin network Bitcoin's political element 
But how does one slay the Hydra~ central banks crisis currency competition deflation 
disruption distributed capitalism Distrust of financial institutions Fiat money Financial 
interconnectedness fringe players gatekeepers innovation innovation as natural 
Intermediaries international coordination internet lack of trust in intermediaries lack of trust 
in monetary policy licensing marketplace of ideas parallelism political economy of 
protocols private money private self regulation Private versus public money protocols 
taxation Technological innovation third world transnational reach unbanked uncertainty 
over definition of Bitcoin
TCH
The Clearing 
House
Worldwide PR Bullettin
anecdotes, facts and figures, data, 
graphs and charts, comparison, 
history, parallelisms
Bitcoin's network, Bitcoin's politics, Consumer and Investor protection, Intermediaries, 
Lack of regulation, money laundering, law enforcement, regulatory approach (licensing), 
need for global, state-based, coordinated and consistent regulation, prudential regulation, 
need for further study and research, task forces, technological innovation, trust
CFPB, 2014, 
FinCEN, 2014, 
GAO, 2014
WSBI
World Savings 
and Retail 
Banking Institute
Worldwide PR Working Paper
anecdote future scenarios positive 
Chart Definitions educating the 
public history parallelism questions 
risk assessment
anonymity bitcoin at most as bad as cash Bitcoin network Bitcoin's political element 
BitLicense Regulations Consumer protection future scenarios innovation Intermediaries 
INVESTOR PROTECTION IT IT risk Lack of regulation licensing money laundering 
need for state regulation positive protocols prudential regulation Regulation regulatory 
apprach Research RISKS study committee task forces techne Technological innovation 
Trust Adoption as key for money alternative uses of the protocol banking Bitcoin as proxy 
cash central banks Consumer beware cost of cash difficulty in definition difficulty of impact 
assessment digital divide disruption do not kill the golden goose Ecosystem educating the 
public Fiat money financial divide financial inclusion Financial interconnectedness 
Functions of money history how much to legislate innovation as natural international 
coordination internet Intrinsic value Law enforcement learning from Bitcoin need for 
consistency in regulation need for global regulation new regulation vs redressing of existing 
framework noise and investment may have a cause political economy of protocols 
regulation arbitrage remittances Risks inherent to understanding Bitcoin Systemic Risk 
taxation The technology The value chain theft transaction transaction fees transnational 
reach trusted third-party unbanked virtual currency vs commodity currency virtual currency 
vs fiat currency virtual economy vs real economy volatility work in progress
CFPB FinCEN GAO 
CGAP European 
Banking Authority, 
EBA FATF FED 
CHICAGO
OCCUPY Occupy Network Worldwide SO Position statement
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